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vSummary
The rst essay examines the impact of capital requirement on banksrisk taking in
Indonesia. Using dynamic panel data models, we nd that there is some evidence that
banks increase their capital or reduce risk when their capital adequacy ratio (CAR)
is lower than, or approaching, the eight percent regulatory minimum. The statistical
signicance of our results, however, is low. Second, when we allow banks to respond
to the capital requirement heterogeneously, we nd that only large private-domestic
banks respond to regulatory pressure properly.
This essays contribution is to o¤er some insights into how capital requirement
may a¤ect banksrisk taking in developing countries. Second, we address common
improper econometric methods in this line of literature, i.e. the estimation of non-
autonomous system of two equations using simultaneous equation approach. Third,
using dynamic panel data models we could deal with the two key unobserved variables
(banksinternal capital- and risk targets) better, and take other unobserved banks
heterogeneity more explicitly into account.
In the second essay, we examine whether selling banks that were bailed out
and recapitalized by the Government of Indonesia to strategic foreign investors im-
proves banksperformance. This banking industry overhaul costs government budget
severely. By the end of 2000, the government has to service debts and to nance a
budget decit which are more than, respectively, 100 percent and 4 percent of GDP.
vi
Facing this large scal decit, the government simply has to sell those private banks.
Using di¤erence-in-di¤erence models and matching estimators, we nd that strate-
gic sale of banks in Indonesia does improve banksperformance. On average, strategic
sale is associated with about 15 percent cost reduction or more.
The focus of this essay is on overcoming problems in treatment evaluation. First,
we never observe counterfactuals and therefore they have to be estimated. Second,
investors may "cherry pick" the most promising banks, the government may sell
only the best banks to maximize revenue, and these choices may not be orthogonal
to unobservable factors that a¤ect banksperformance. The structure of our data,
to some extent, reduces this potential source of bias. Second, to control for time-
invariant unobservable banks characteristics that may confound identication, we
use panel data and di¤erence-in-di¤erence models. Further, to address some potential
biases in these latter models, we use matching estimators.
The third essay is a short theoretical paper that looks on whether capital require-
ment and audit policy could prevent banks from taking excessive risk when regulator
does not observe bankscapital and investment decision. Banks may be of two types:
high- or low capitalized; and have two investment choices: risky or prudent assets.
We explore how capital requirement and audit policy may induce banks to be well
behaved. We show that, if regulator does not observe bankscapital or investment
decision, then regulator must audit banks to enforce the capital requirement.
The fourth essay looks at the relationship between bankse¢ ciency and types of
ownership in Indonesia. Literature suggests that ownership matters. In particular,
researchers argue that state-owned banks are less e¢ cient than private banks and
foreign-owned banks. Taking Indonesian banking industry as a case study, we inves-
tigate the relationship between bankstypes of ownership and banks performance.
vii
We use Greene (2002, 2005)s truepanel data stochastic frontier models to take un-
observed banksheterogeneity more explicitly into account. We nd that state-owned
banks are the least e¢ cient banks, and joint-venture banks are the most e¢ cient ones.
viii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Banking industry is prone to crises; and when crisis strikes, it is costly. Honohan
and Klingebiel (2003) estimate that, in 40 bank crises since 1980, bank resolution
costs on average 13 percent of the countriesGDP. Recent bank crises in East Asian
countries cost their economies dearly, ranging from 20-55 percent of their GDP. More-
over, it often leads to an economic recession that burdens the economy even further
with higher unemployment rate and a few years of slower economic growth.1
To cope with these problems, governments regulate banks. To prevent banks
from taking excessive risk, for example, regulators have been relying on the Basel
Accord, a bank regulation designed by the Basel committee of the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlement. Published in 1988, the Accord is primarily designed to level the
international competition of banking industry and to prevent banksexcessive risk
taking.2 It was originally intended to be applied to internationally active banks in
OECD countries. However, currently it has been voluntarily adopted by more than
100 countries, including developing ones. In most cases, it is imposed on all banks,
1For an analysis of the recent East Asian nancial crisis, see for example Radelet and Sachs
(2002).
2See Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) for an exposition of this accord. Information on Basel Accord
is available at the BISwebsite, i.e. http://www.bis.org/index.htm.
2not just the internationally active ones.3
Despite the convergence of bank regulation around the world, some economists
argue that the ne-tuned Basel Accord is not su¢ cient for regulating and supervis-
ing banks in developing countries. Honohan and Stiglitz (2001), for example, argue
that regulators in these countries might need to implement a more robust nancial
restraint, at least temporarily during their transition from less developed- into more
advanced nancial markets.
These robust policies are those whose violations are easier to detect and penalty
can be easily enforced. They are, for example, entry requirement, deposit interest
ceiling, risk ceiling, or limit on banksactivities. These properties are desirable due
to the severity of the informational, enforceability, and agency problems that are
often plagued developing economies. To make things even worse, these economies
often su¤er from limited credibility of government and widespread corruption.
Honohan and Stiglitzs argument might be more relevant due to the hasty liber-
alization of nancial industry in many developing countries where governments have
dismantled nancial repression and regulation and at the same time exposed banks
to more risk. For example, Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) show that, as
the banking industry is liberalized and getting more competitive, banks franchise
becomes less valuable and banks may have more incentive to take more risk. They
also nd that, in this environment, capital regulation alone is not su¢ cient for an
optimal regulation: Robust nancial policies such as deposit interest ceiling need to
be implemented as well.
In a related development, some governments in developing countries have also pri-
vatized state-owned banks and introduced competition to domestic banking industry.
3For a discussion on the rationales for bank regulation, see for example Bhattacharya, Boot and
Thakor (1998).
3In many cases, these governments allow foreign-owned banks to enter domestic mar-
ket and compete with domestic banks. Recently, some governments even sell banks
they own or manage to strategic foreign investors.
These lead us to some research questions. In an environment like those in devel-
oping countries, can regulator enforce capital requirement? Does capital requirement
prevent banks in developing countries from taking too much risk? Does privatization
improve bankse¢ ciency? Is there any relationship between bankstype of owner-
ship in developing countries and bankse¢ ciency? How important is audit policy for
regulator to enforce capital requirement?
Taking Indonesian banking industry as a case study, we address some of these
questions in this thesis. Examining Indonesian banking industry is interesting for
several reasons.4 First, it would complement the current empirical literature that
primarily focused on banks in the developed countries. Second, Indonesia experienced
an arguably hasty liberalization in the late 1980s that leads to a sharp increase in
the number of private banks without su¢ cient safeguard measures and regulation.
Thanks to a new central banking law recently enacted, Bank Indonesia the regulator
of Indonesian banking industry has now become a more independent central bank.
Bank Indonesia also has adopted a new and more thorough nancial reporting system
which allows us to scrutinize banksnancial statement.
This thesis comprises three empirical- and one theoretical essays. We organize
this thesis as follows: In Chapter 2 we examine whether capital requirement induces
Indonesian banks to limit risk-taking. Chapter 3 examines whether selling Indonesian
banks managed by the government to strategic foreign investors improves banks
performance. In Chapter 4 we model the e¤ectiveness of capital requirement and
4For an exposition of the evolution of Indonesian banking industry, see Cole and Slade (1996).
4audit policy when regulator does not observe bankscapital and investment decision.
Chapter 5 looks at the relationship between bankse¢ ciency and types of ownership.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes.
5Chapter 2
Does Capital Requirement Induce Banks
to Limit Risk-taking?
2.1 Introduction
This essay examines the impact of capital requirement on banksrisk taking. We
focus on the case of a developing country, Indonesia, to see how this regulation fares
in an environment where prudential regulation may not be as e¤ective as that in the
developed world.
The central question is whether capital requirement prevents banks in developing
countries from taking too much risk. Do banks increase their capital ratio when the
ratio is lower than, or approaching the regulatory minimum? How do banks comply
with the regulation: by increasing capital or reducing risk? Do su¢ ciently capitalized-
and undercapitalized banks behave di¤erently?
Regulator imposes capital requirement on banks to control banks risk-taking.
Following the Basel Accord,1 regulator typically requires banks to hold capital at
least eight percent of their risk-weighted assets. Banks may or may not invest in
high-risk assets; but if they do so, they have to commit su¢ cient amount of capital
1See Basel (2003) for a detailed description of Basels risk-based capital requirement.
6on the line.
Banks facing capital requirement, however, may not behave as regulator wants
them to. At the outset, risk-based capital requirement works well only if the risk-
weightings capture the true banksbusiness risk. Some argue that asset-risk classi-
cations of the Basel Accord are too coarse so that, to take more risk and maintain
capital ratio, banks may shift their portfolios from low-risk to high-risk assets within
each risk category. Moreover, if banksfranchise value is low, banks may gamble for
resurrection today to comply with the capital requirement tomorrow.
On the other hand, if regulatory penalties are heavy and raising capital instanta-
neously is costly, banks may hold a bu¤er of excess capital to reduce the probability
of having capital ratio falls below the minimum required. Whenever bankscapital
falls below this bu¤er, though it may still be higher than the minimum requirement,
banks increase their capital ratio by raising capital or reducing risk.
To estimate the e¤ect of capital requirement on banksbehavior using dynamic
panel models, we regress bankscapital and risk on a dummy for regulatory pressure
and a set of control variables. The coe¢ cient of regulatory dummy equals one for
banks that are under regulatory pressure to comply with the capital regulation and
zero otherwise would then measure how banks, constrained by capital requirement,
choose their capital and risk.
We nd some evidence that regulator could enforce capital requirement in a devel-
oping country like Indonesia. Our basic results show that banks increase their capital
ratio when their CAR is lower than, or approaching the eight percent regulatory
minimum. They do so primarily by raising capital, thus increasing the numerator of
CAR. Banks whose capital and risk, hence CAR, are below their own CAR minimum
threshold, however, prefer reducing risk rather than increasing capital to reach their
7own threshold.
However, the statistical signicance of our results is low so that the results are
too weak to be general. Second, when we allow di¤erent bank types to respond
heterogeneously, we nd that, among the inadequately capitalized banks, only large
private-national banks that are under regulatory pressure increase capital or reduce
risk more than adequately capitalized banks.
This essay is organized as follows: In Section 2.2 we review related literature
and in Section 2.3 we briey describe capital requirement in Indonesia. Section 2.4
presents our methodology. Section 2.5 describes the data and Section 2.6 discusses
empirical results. In Section 2.7 we do some robustness checks. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
We follow the literature on capital requirement and bank behavior in the line of
Shrieves and Dahl (1992). However, we depart from this literature in three ways.
First, we argue that the system of two equations of bankscapital and risk in this
literature are not autonomous and therefore estimating the models using simultaneous
equation approach is inappropriate.
Second, we treat the unobservable banksinternal capital- and risk targets better.
In the literature, researchers approximate these unobservable targets by a set of prox-
ies. We instead appeal to the notion that, after controlling for bankscharacteristics,
banksbusiness entity remain the same during period of analysis and therefore banks
would have the same capital and risk target. We then could eliminate these xed
targets by di¤erencing using panel data analysis.
Third, to the best of our knowledge, except Heid, Porath and Stolz (2004), all
empirical works in this literature use pooled data analysis thus leaving much of banks
8heterogeneity unaccounted for. By using panel data analysis in this essay, we could
control for banksheterogeneity better.
This essay also shed some light on how banks in developing countries respond
to capital requirement, and therefore complementing the literature that primarily
looks on banks in US and Europe. By focusing on developing countrys banks, we
examine the impact of capital requirement on banks behavior in an environment
where regulator is far from perfect, and the problems of asymmetric information
are more di¢ cult to be alleviated. Besides, whether banks comply with the capital
requirement in a developing country like Indonesia is of interest in itself. Indonesian
banking industry has just survived an economic recession and banking crisis. The
regulator also has just gained its independence, and implemented a more thorough
system of banksnancial statement reporting.
The empirical literature following Shrieves and Dahl (1992)s framework typically
shows that banks in developed countries comply with the capital requirement, either
by reducing risk or by increasing capital.2 Bear in mind, however, that these ndings
may not be accurate due to the simultaneous equation estimation of non-autonomous
equations. Moreover, we cannot say that the same would apply to banks in developing
countries as well. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006), for example, using cross-country
data analysis, show that strengthening the discretionary powers of prudential supervi-
sors in countries with weak institutional environments leads to, among others, banks
that are less sound.
There are two strands of theoretical literature on capital regulation: moral-hazard-
2See, for example, Rime (2001) for an analysis of capital requirement in Switzerland. For US
data, besides Shrieves and Dahl (1992), there are, among others, Jacques and Nigro (1997), and
Aggarwal and Jacques (1998). In recent working papers, Kle¤ and Weber (2004) and Heid, Porath
and Stolz (2004) look at Germanys banks.
9based models and the theories of bu¤er capital.3 In the moral hazard literature, Koehn
and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988), for example, by adopting
the portfolio approach of Pyle (1971) and Hart and Ja¤ee (1974), nd that capital
requirement restricts the risk-return frontier of banks, forces them to reduce leverage,
and to take more risk. Regulator could eliminate this adverse e¤ect by implementing
risk-based capital requirement.
Keeley and Furlong (1990) and Rochet (1992) criticize this conclusion by arguing
that Pyle-Hart-Ja¤ee frameworks ignore the limited liability constraint of banks and
inappropriately treat bank capital the same as other securities. By considering these
critiques, Rochet (1992), for example, shows that the convexity of preference due to
limited liability may dominate risk aversion, and banks, if undercapitalized, will be a
risk lover. In this case, even risk-based capital requirement does not help. To restrain
banks from taking excessive risk, it may be necessary to require a minimum capital
level.
Blum (1999) considers a two period model of capital regulation. He nds that
banks may increase risk in period one because tighter restriction lowers banksex-
pected prot and franchise value and hence lower banksloss in the event of bank-
ruptcy. Second, equity tomorrow is more valuable, and if raising capital is very costly,
then the only way banks could satisfy the requirement tomorrow is by increasing risk
today.
The second strand of literature, the bu¤er capital theory, argues that banks may
nd it optimal to maintain capital more than they are required to. If banks have
su¢ cient franchise value, Milne and Whalley (2001) show that forward-looking banks
maintain a bu¤er of capital in excess of the regulatory minimum. They also show
3See Santos (2001) for a theoretical literature review of bank capital regulation.
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that incentives for risk taking depend on the bu¤er, not the total capital; and capital
requirements have no long run e¤ect on bank risk-taking. Milne (2002) considers
the case in which regulator monitors capital requirements ex-post. He nds that if
banks have franchise value and penalty for breaching capital requirements are heavy
enough, banks may nd it benecial to keep more capital than required.
2.3 Capital Requirement in Indonesia
On paper, capital requirement has been the backbone of Indonesias prudential
regulation since 1991 when Indonesia adopted the newly minted the Basel Accord.
The central bank, Bank Indonesia, which is also the regulator, requires banks to main-
tain capital at least eight percent of risk-weighted assets. Along with other pruden-
tial regulation, regulator also imposes prompt corrective action (PCA), quantitative-
rating system based on banks capital, asset, management, equity, and liquidity
(CAMEL), on Indonesian banks. 4
In practice, however, regulator had not always been able to enforce these pru-
dential regulations, including capital requirement. Financial crises since the 1990s
forced regulator to forbear capital requirement several times. Suhartos administra-
tion often interfered and prevented regulator from shutting failed-banks down. Bogus
accounting was the norm, and non-compliance was rarely penalized. Besides, as some
authors argue, Bank Indonesia then had yet to acquire experience and technical skills
in banking regulation and supervision.
The turning point of bank regulation in Indonesia was the aftermath of the 1998
nancial crisis. Once again, Bank Indonesia forborne prudential regulation. This
time, however, many banks were closed, some were merged, and most others had
4The PCA follows the 1991 US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act
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to recapitalize themselves to avoid closing. More importantly, as a part of the IMF
sponsored economic reforms, a new central banking law was enacted, and this law
enabled Bank Indonesia to be a more independent central bank.5
Since then, Bank Indonesia has improved a number of prudential regulations,
including a new and more thorough nancial reporting system. It also is building its
capacity to regulate and supervise banks.
2.4 Methodology
2.4.1 Model Specication
The literature following Shrieves and Dahl (1992) models the observed changes in
bankscapital and risk as the sum of banksdiscretionary adjustment and exogenous
shocks to capital and risk as follows:
Capitalit = 
dCapitalit + Ecit (2.1)
Riskit = 
dRiskit + Erit (2.2)
where Capitalit and Riskit are the observed changes in bank is capital and risk
in period t respectively; dCapitalit and dRiskit are bank is discretionary changes
in capital and risk in period t; and Ecit and Erit are respectively exogenous shocks
to bankscapital and risk.
To recognize that banks may not be able to adjust their desired capital and risk
instantaneously, researchers assume that the discretionary changes in bankscapital
and risk are proportional to the di¤erence between bankscapital and risk targets
5See Pangestu and Habir (2002) for a brief summary on the 1998 banking crises and the subse-
quent bank restructuring.
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and their corresponding values in the previous period, i.e.:
dCapitalit = 1 (Capital

it   Capitalit 1) (2.3)
dRiskit = 2 (Risk

it  Riskit 1) (2.4)
where Capitalit and Risk

it are bank is target capital and risk respectively.
Substituting these two equations into Equations (2.1) and (2.2), the equations for
the observed changes in bankscapital and risk then become
Capitalit = 1 (Capital

it   Capitalit 1) + Ecit (2.5)
Riskit = 2 (Risk

it  Riskit 1) + Erit (2.6)
The observed changes in bankscapital and risk are therefore a function of target
capital and risk, lagged capital and risk, and some exogenous variables. The coe¢ cient
 is the speed of adjustment it measures how fast banks adjust their current capital
and risk to the corresponding targets.
Researchers then derive regression models for observed changes in capital and risk
from the capital equation, Equation (2.5), and risk equation, Equation (2.6). First,
the bankstarget capital Capitalit and risk Risk

it are not observed, and have to be
approximated. Second, appealing to the theoretical literature that banks may choose
capital and risk simultaneously, researchers put a measure of risk on the right hand
side of the capital equation and capital on the right hand side of the risk equation.
Moreover, banks that are under regulatory pressure to comply with the capital re-
quirement may be forced to increase capital or reduce risk more than adequately
capitalized banks. To capture this idea, researchers also introduce a dummy for reg-
ulatory pressure Regit 1as an additional explanatory variable. This dummy equals
one if bank i at time t  1 is under regulatory pressure and zero otherwise.
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The working regressions are then specied as follows:
Capitalit = 01 + 1Regit 1   1Capitalit 1 + 1xit + 1Riskit + it (2.7)
Riskit = 02 + 2Regit 1   2Riskit 1 + 2xit + 2Capitalit + it (2.8)
which are usually estimated using simultaneous estimation methods.
We depart from this line of literature in three ways. First, we recognize that banks
determine the combination of Capitalit and Riskit simultaneously. However, intro-
ducing Capitalit and Riskit in the right hand sides of Equation (2.7) and (2.8),
respectively, is not appropriate because the equations are not autonomous. These
equations would be meaningless because there is no way to examine what happens to
changes in bankscapital, Capitalit, if bank i is under regulatory pressure (Regit
becomes 1) holding the change in banksrisk, Riskit, constant.
According toWooldridge (2002), this kind of mistake estimating non-autonomous
system of equations using simultaneous equation models is quite common in the em-
pirical literature.
Second, rather than approximating bankstarget by a number of proxies, we as-
sume that, after controlling for bankscharacteristics, bankstargets are xed during
the period of analysis. Third, we control bankscharacteristics more explicitly by tak-
ing advantage of the panel structure of our data and introducing banksxed e¤ects
in addition to the vector of control variables xit.
We would therefore estimate a panel data models. Moreover, we will not estimate
Equations (2.7) and (2.8) using simultaneous equation models, rather we will estimate
the capital and risk equations separately without controlling for risk and capital,
respectively, in each equation. Then, we also estimate a corresponding regression in
which we use the ratio between banksCapital and Risk, i.e. CAR, as the dependent
variable.
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We therefore derive our regressions as follows: Starting from Equations (2.5) and
(2.6), our capital and risk equations are:
Capitalit = 1Regit 1 + 1 (Capital

it   Capitalit 1) + 1xit
+0i + t + it (2.9)
Riskit = 2Regit 1 + 2 (Risk

it  Riskit 1) + 2xit
+0i + t + it (2.10)
where Capitalit and Riskit are the observed changes in bank is capital and risk
in period t respectively; Regit is a dummy variable that equals one if bank i in period
t is under regulatory pressure to comply with the capital requirement; Capitalit and
Riskit are bank is capital and risk targets in period t respectively; xit is a vector




i are bank is xed e¤ects, and t and
t are time-e¤ect at time t; the error term it and it are bank time-varying errors,
assumed to be distributed independently of 0i and t and 
0
i and t respectively.
We assume that during the period of our analysis, after controlling for banks
characteristics, banksbusiness entity remains the same and therefore banks would
have the same capital and risk target. Capital and risk targets then become time-
invariants Capitali and Risk

i respectively, and therefore submerge into banksxed
e¤ect, respectively i and i. The capital and risk equations become:
Capitalit = 1Regit 1   1Capitalit 1 + 1xit + i + t + it (2.11)
Riskit = 2Regit 1   2Riskit 1 + 2xit + i + t + it (2.12)











To facilitate standard estimation, we modify Equation (2.11) and (2.12) by adding
CAPit 1 to both sides of Equation (2.11) and RISKit 1 to both sides of Equation
(2.12). Our working specication then simplify into standard dynamic panel data
analysis as follows:
Capitalit = 1Regit 1 + (1  1)Capitalit 1 + 1xit + i + t + it (2.13)
Riskit = 2Regit 1 + (1  2)Riskit 1 + 2xit + i + t + it (2.14)
Using these two regressions, we could examine how banks adjust their capital and
risk if they are under regulatory pressure to comply with the capital requirement. To
see how banks choose the combination of both Capital and Risk, we also estimate
similar regression in which we put capital ratio, CAR, as the dependent variable as
follows:
CARit = 3Regit 1 + (1  3)CARit 1 + 3xit + 'i +  t + !it (2.15)
where CAR = Capital = Risk:
2.4.2 Main Hypothesis
We take as the null hypotheses that banks under regulatory pressure behave like
those which are not. We therefore state our main hypothesis as follows:
H1 : Regulatory pressure to comply with the capital requirement does not a¤ect banks
capital decision.
H2 : Regulatory pressure does not a¤ect banksrisk decision.
Our primary interest is therefore the signicance and magnitude of both 1 and
2 the coe¢ cients of REGit 1 in Equation (2.13) and (2.14) respectively. Large
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positive 1 and negative 2 would be against our hypothesis, i.e. banks that are
under regulatory pressure to comply with the capital regulation would raise more
capital or reduce more risk compared to adequately capitalized banks.
We also expect (1  1) and (1  2), the coe¢ cients of lagged dependent vari-
ables, to be positive. From these estimates, we could then get the speed of capital-
and risk adjustment, . Positive estimates of speed of adjustment suggest that banks
adjust its capital and risk towards its own capital- and risk target over time. The
larger the , the faster banks adjust their capital or risk toward the targets.
Among bankscharacteristics in the vector of control variables xit are bankssize
and income. Larger banks may need to raise larger capital and reduce larger risk
ceteris paribus. The more protable banks may be able to raise larger capital and
reduce more risk. These banks could, however, a¤ord higher risk too.
2.4.3 Method of Estimation
We estimate the basic regressions in Equations (2.13) and (2.14) using dynamic
panel data technique, i.e. both Arellano and Bond (1991)s rst-di¤erenced GMM
estimator and Blundell and Bond (1998)s system GMM estimator.
To eliminate the individual e¤ects, we rst take the rst-di¤erence of the mod-
els. Then we instrument all endogenous- and pre-determined variables by a set of
instrumental variables.
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest that we use entire lagged of endogenous- and
pre-determined variables as instruments and then estimate the model using General-
ized Method of Moments (GMM). Because the number of period (T ) in our sample is
19 and the number of group (N) is about 130, should we use the entire lag, the num-
ber of instruments would be large. To avoid having biased estimates due to too large
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number instruments, we therefore present the results using two- and three lagged of
endogenous variables and one- and two lagged of pre-determined variables only.
Because the lagged level may be poor instruments for rst di¤erence, Blundell
and Bond (1998) further propose adding the lagged-di¤erences of endogenous and
pre-determined variables as instruments. For the same reasons above, we present the
results of system GMM using two- and three lagged of endogenous variables and one-
and two lagged of pre-determined variables only. Because the two-step estimates of
standard errors may be severely downward-biased, we use the nite-sample correction
of covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005).
We also present the results of xed e¤ect and OLS for basic regressions to see
whether the coe¢ cients of lagged dependent variable of GMM estimators are too
biased or not.
2.5 Data
We use the quarterly nancial statement of Indonesian banking industry provided
by the Bank Indonesias Department of Banking Statistics. The dataset consists of
quarterly nancial reports of about 130 banks over more than four-year period since
the fourth quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2005. It covers all commercial
banks in Indonesia, and, because Indonesian capital markets are still quite small, this
data represents a large portion of Indonesian nancial industry. It excludes, however,
the typically small Indonesian credit and saving banks (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat).
This nancial statement provides detailed nancial information about each bank.
In particular, it provides banksassets and liabilities as well as their capital, risk-
weighted assets, and CAR which are important in analyzing the impact of capital
requirement on bank behavior.
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There are six types of bank ownership. For the year of 2001, for example, our
sample includes 5 state-owned banks, 35 "large private-national" banks, 37 "small
private-national" banks, 26 "regional-development" banks, 18 "joint-venture " banks,
and 11 foreign-owned banks.6 State-owned banks are among the largest, followed by
"large private-national" banks and "small private-national" banks. The largest eight
banks have eighty percent of Indonesias banking assets. Except state banks and a
few "large-private national" banks, most other banks are quite small.
Despite the apparent heterogeneity of banks, for our basic regressions, we keep all
banks in our sample. Later, to see the robustness of our results, we focus on some
more homogenous groups of banks.
A few banks do not submit nancial reports for a number of quarters. These
missing observations, however, are a small proportion of our sample and therefore
would not a¤ect our results much. At the time we process the dataset, some banks
have not reported their nancial statement for the last quarter in our sample, the
second quarter of 2005.
2.5.1 Capital and Risk
As a measure of capital, in our basic regressions, we use the amount of capi-
tal banks reports in their nancial statement (Capital).7 In the literature, capital
ratios capital to assets ratio or capital to risk-weighted asset ratio are more pop-
ular. However, because we are examining whether banks under regulatory pressure
6"Large private-national banks may trade foreign currencies while "small private-national" banks
may not. Both are domestic banks, however. Regional development banks are owned by provincial
governments, and therefore are like state bank though they are typically small. "Joint venture"
banks are joint ventures between domestic- and foreign owners. Foreign banks are owned by foreign
investors.
7Bank Indonesias denition of capital follows Basel Accord (Basel, 2003).
19
would increase capital or not, we think Capital is better than capital ratios. Besides,
we will also control for bankssize using the value of banksassets in our regressions.
As a proxy for risk, we use banksrisk-weighted assets (Risk).8 Obviously, this
proxy is not a perfect measure of banksrisk. First, it assumes that the risk-weightings
correctly capture the risk of di¤erent types of assets. Second, as some argue, the
weightings are too coarse so that using Risk as a measure of risk ignores banks
preference putting their assets in the most risky assets in each asset category.
Unfortunately, our data does not give us better proxy of banks risk, and for
that matter, capital. At the very least, we believe that Capital and Risk are highly
correlated with the true bankscapital and risk, respectively. Moreover, regulator
also uses these two measures to enforce capital requirement. This essay would then
at least o¤er a look into how banks respond to capital requirement the regulator
imposes on them.
2.5.2 Regulatory Pressure
We use two types of proxies for regulatory pressure Reg. The simplest one is
PCA measure of regulatory pressure, RegPCA, a dummy equals one if banksCAR
is less than the minimum capital requirement set by regulator and zero otherwise.9
The coe¢ cient of this variable captures how much banks would increase or decrease
their capital compared to adequately capitalized banks should the banks CAR falls
below the minimum required.
The second one is the probabilistic measure of regulatory pressure, RegPROB.
This measure takes into account that banksCAR is volatile. Therefore, to avoid
8Again, we do not use risk ratio for the same reason that we do not use capital ratio.
9Normally, the minimum capital requirement is eight percent. However, in the aftermath of the
crises until 2001 central bank requires four percent minimum capital requirement for some banks.
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failing to meet the legal requirement, banks may set a higher minimum CAR threshold
for itself. We dene RegPROB equals one if banksCAR is below some bank-specic
minimum threshold and zero otherwise. We set the threshold to be one standard
deviation of banksCAR over the period of analysis above the legal requirement.
2.5.3 Control Variables
The rest of the variables are in x, a vector of banksspecic characteristics. They
are banksassets (Size) as measure of bankssize, banksprots (Income) as a mea-
sure of banksability to raise capital through retained earnings, and some dummies
for bank types (state-owned, private, foreign-owned, and joint-venture banks).
A set of bank xed e¤ects and time e¤ects would complete our model. These bank
xed e¤ects would control for banksxed characteristics, including bankscapital and
risk targets, Capital and Risk. The time e¤ects would control for factors that may
a¤ect all banks in each period such as economic growth and other changes in business
environment.
In some specications, especially for robustness checks, we also introduce a dummy
for public banks (TPublic), a dummy for banks sold to strategic investors (TSold).
We also use lagged risk-weighted assets (Riskit 1) in the capital equation and lagged
capital (Capitalit 1) in the risk equation.10




Table 2.1 presents the results for the capital equation: Regressions using PCA
measure of regulatory pressure, RegPCA, are on the left panel; those using proba-
bilistic measure, RegPROB, are on the right panel.
Columns (1-4), respectively, report system GMM, rst-di¤erenced GMM, xed
e¤ect and OLS estimators. The coe¢ cients of lagged dependent variable Capitalit 1
of the system GMM are as we expect from a consistent GMM estimator: They are
smaller than those of the OLS and are bigger than those of the xed e¤ect. However,
the coe¢ cient of Capitalit 1 of the rst-di¤erenced GMM is well below that of xed
e¤ect. Therefore, we should not rely too much on the estimates in Column (2).
The coe¢ cient of RegPCA in Column (1), though statistically signicant at 20
percent level of signicance only, is economically large. It suggests that undercapital-
ized banks whose CAR is lower than eight percent by the end of last period and being
subject to the regulatory pressure to comply with the capital requirement would in-
crease its capital by Rp 300 million on average, about 41 percent of the mean of all
bankscapital.
The coe¢ cients of RegPROB on the right panel, on the other hand, are close to
zero and statistically insignicant.
The rst set of estimates indicates that, to immediately comply with the eight
percent capital requirement, an undercapitalized bank simply has to raise capital
more than adequately capitalized banks. The second set of estimates shows that
banks whose CAR are lower than their own CAR threshold, as far as capital decision
is concerned, behave like any other banks. These banks may be under regulatory
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Dependent Variable: Capitalt
SYS DIFF SYS DIFF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RegPCAt-1 0.295 0.316 0.331 0.296
(0.231) (0.278) 0.240 (0.247)
RegPROBt-1 -0.008 -0.024 -0.002 0.002
(0.023) (0.027) (0.012) (0.006)
Capitalt-1 0.873 0.745 0.848 0.916 0.875 0.748 0.840 0.911
(0.058) (0.145) (0.075) (0.039) (0.063) (0.143) (0.084) (0.046)
Sizet 0.008 0.072 0.012 0.006 0.008 0.068 0.012 0.006
(0.002) (0.035) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.033) (0.007) (0.001)
Incomet 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
AR(1) -1.92 -1.80 -1.92 -1.79
AR(2) 0.99 0.80 1.00 0.82
Hansen [0.096] [0.003] [0.055] [0.042]
Observations 2,165 1,980 2,165 2,165 2,165 1,980 2,165 2,165
Note: The estimators are system GMM, first-differenced GMM, fixed effect and ordinary least squares. GMM results are one-
step estimates. GMM regressions include lagged dated t-2 and t-3 as instruments. All regressions include time dummies.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, respectively. Hansen is a test of the
overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators; it uses the minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM




Table 2.1: Capital Equation
pressure too, but they do not have to raise capital to increase capital ratio. Instead,
they may opt for other means like reducing risk, especially when raising capital is
very costly.
The coe¢ cients of Capitalit 1 in Column (1) suggests that the speed of capital
adjustment, 1, is signicant both statistically and economically. Banks on average
cut the di¤erence between previous period capital and target capital by about 13
percent, which means banks typically halve the capital gap within a year and a half.
The coe¢ cients of Size and Income are positive and statistically signicant. The
larger the bank is, the more it needs to raise capital; the more protable the bank is,
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the more easily it could increase capital. However, controlling for other explanatory
variables, including previous period capital as well as individual- and time e¤ects,
the impacts of Size and Income on bankscapital decision is small. For every Rp 1
billion increase of banksSize (assets) or Income, banks raise their capital by a few
million rupiahs only.
Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions in Column (1) does not reject the
null hypothesis that our instruments are valid. As we expect, the tests for serial
correlation reject the null hypothesis of no rst-order serial correlation of residuals of
the rst-di¤erenced equation, but do not reject the null hypothesis that there is no
second-order serial correlation.
2.6.2 Risk Equation
Table 2.2 presents the risk equation: Regressions using RegPCA are on the left
panel; those using RegPROB are on the right panel.
Columns (1-4), respectively, report system GMM, rst-di¤erenced GMM, xed
e¤ect, and OLS estimators. The coe¢ cients of lagged dependent variable Riskit 1
of the OLS, xed e¤ect and system GMM are about the same, while that of rst-
di¤erenced GMM is well below that of xed e¤ect. Though we should take the
results of this risk equation with care, we console to the fact that the coe¢ cients of
Capitalit 1 of the system GMM are between that of OLS and that of xed e¤ect.
The coe¢ cient of RegPCA in Column (1) is negative, though statistically insignif-
icant. It suggests that an undercapitalized bank, as far as risk decision is concerned,
behaves like adequately capitalized banks.
The coe¢ cients of lagged dependent variable Riskit 1 on the right panel suggest
that the system GMM is better. The coe¢ cient of RegPROB of the system GMM
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Dependent Variable: Riskt
SYS DIFF SYS DIFF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RegPCAt-1 -0.022 0.167 0.124 -0.029
(0.023) (0.424) (0.113) (0.032)
RegPROBt-1 -0.097 -0.141 -0.069 -0.053
(0.090) (0.141) (0.036) (0.033)
Riskt-1 0.984 0.853 0.938 0.991 0.984 0.847 0.938 0.991
(0.030) (0.094) (0.036) (0.025) (0.030) (0.101) (0.036) (0.025)
Sizet 0.015 0.367 0.105 0.015 0.015 0.378 0.105 0.015
(0.004) (0.059) (0.014) (0.003) (0.004) (0.060) (0.015) (0.003)
Incomet 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
AR(1) -1.97 -1.73 -1.96 -1.71
AR(2) -0.22 -0.55 -0.23 -0.57
Hansen [0.091] [0.001] [0.000] [0.030]
Observations 2,165 1,980 2,165 2,165 2,165 1,980 2,165 2,165
Note: The estimators are system GMM, first-differenced GMM, fixed effect and ordinary least squares. GMM results are one-
step estimates. GMM regressions include lagged dated t-2 and t-3 as instruments. All regressions include time dummies.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, respectively. Hansen is a test of the
overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators; it uses the minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM




Table 2.2: Risk Equation
is negative, though it is statistically signicant at 30 percent level of signicance
only. These estimates show that a bank whose CAR is lower than its own CAR
threshold last period may reduce risk about Rp 100 million to comply with the capital
requirement, about three percent of the mean of all banksrisk-weighted assets.
The rst set of estimates indicates that, to comply with the eight percent capital
requirement, undercapitalized banks do not rely much on reducing risk. They prefer
raising capital as we show in Table 2.1. On the other hand, the second set of estimates
suggest that banks whose CAR are lower than their own CAR threshold may do just
the opposite: They prefer reducing risk, not raising capital.
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The coe¢ cients of Riskit 1 in all system GMM specications suggest that the
speed of risk adjustment, 2, is statistically signicant in all two system GMM speci-
cations. Unlike the speed of capital adjustment, they are very small, however. Banks
on average cut the di¤erence between previous period risk and target risk by about
three percent per quarter, which means banks typically halve the capital gap within
almost six years.
The coe¢ cients of Size and Income are positive and are statistically signicant.
Like those in the capital equation, they are not economically signicant, however.
Nonetheless, these estimates suggest that the larger or the more protable the bank
is, the larger the risk it could a¤ord.
The two system GMM specications pass the tests for overidentifying restrictions
and for serial correlation.
Do note that, unlike in the capital equation, in this risk equation we introduce
the dummy for public banks, TPublic, which is equals one for banks that have gone
public and zero otherwise. We include TPublic because using only Size and Income
as control variables leads to very similar coe¢ cients of lagged dependent variable
Riskit 1 of the OLS, xed e¤ect and system GMM. Our estimates in the capital
equation on the other hand are about the same whether we include or TPublic not.
2.6.3 CAR as Dependent Variable
To conrm that banks that are under regulatory pressure to comply with the
capital requirement tend to increase CAR, we reestimate capital equation using CAR
as the dependent variable.
Table 2.3 presents the results. The coe¢ cients of lagged dependent variable
CARit 1 on both panels suggest that the system GMM is better.
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Dependent Variable: CARt
SYS DIFF SYS DIFF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RegPCAt-1 8.019 18.586 10.675 10.327
(7.725) (9.859) (4.737) (7.475)
RegPROBt-1 3.038 1.274 -2.123 0.899
(1.705) (2.795) (1.331) (0.821)
CARt-1 0.908 0.594 0.714 0.918 0.902 0.541 0.700 0.917
(0.046) (0.094) (0.063) (0.018) (0.047) (0.115) (0.062) (0.018)
Sizet -0.029 0.282 -0.236 -0.049 -0.023 0.144 -0.243 -0.047
(0.029) (0.305) (0.164) (0.029) (0.030) (0.256) (0.166) (0.026)
Incomet 0.011 0.031 0.022 0.017 0.009 0.027 0.022 0.016
(0.010) (0.022) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.023) (0.016) (0.010)
AR(1) -2.95 -2.64 -2.96 -2.47
AR(2) -0.65 -0.80 -0.66 -0.85
Hansen [0.132] [0.019] [0.116] [0.163]
Observations 2,165 1,980 2,165 2,165 2,165 1,980 2,165 2,165
Note: The estimators are system GMM, first-differenced GMM, fixed effect and ordinary least squares. GMM results are one-
step estimates. GMM regressions include lagged dated t-2 and t-3 as instruments. All regressions include time dummies.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, respectively. Hansen is a test of the
overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators; it uses the minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM




Table 2.3: CAR Equation
The coe¢ cients of RegPCA in Column (1), though signicant at 30 percent level
of signicance only, are economically large. It suggests that an undercapitalized bank
would increase its CAR by about eight percentage point within one quarter.
The coe¢ cients of RegPROB in Column (5), on the other hand, are statistically
signicant at ten percent level of signicance and quite large economically. It suggests
that banks whose CAR are lower than their own CAR threshold last period would
increase their CAR by three percentage points.
These results are consistent with the results of capital- and risk equations. Both
undercapitalized banks and those whose CAR below their own threshold tend to
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increase their CAR. The rst group of banks does so primarily by raising capital,
while the second by reducing risk.
The coe¢ cients of CAPit 1 in Columns (1) and (5) suggest that the speed of CAR
adjustment is signicant both statistically and economically. Banks on average cut
the di¤erence between previous period CAR and target CAR by about ten percent
per quarter, which means banks typically halve the CAR gap within two years.
The coe¢ cients of Size and Income are insignicant, both statistically and eco-
nomically. The system GMM in Columns (1) and (5) pass the usual diagnostic tests.
2.6.4 Controlling for Capital and Risk
To see how our results compared to the literature, we introduce lagged capital
into the risk equation and lagged risk into the capital equation. Table 2.4 presents
the results.
Overall we nd similar results: Banks whose CAR are below the minimum eight
percent tend to increase their capital while those whose CAR are below the banks
own minimumCAR threshold tend to reduce risk. The coe¢ cients are not statistically
signicant, however.
2.6.5 Allowing heterogeneous responses
Previously we restrict all banks, whatever their types, responding to regulatory
pressure the same way. To allow di¤erent type of banks to respond di¤erently, we
introduce interactive dummies between the type of ownership dummy and the dummy
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Dep. Variable





Capitalt-1 0.840 0.851 0.024 0.045
(0.051) (0.055) (0.080) (0.092)
Riskt-1 0.015 0.013 0.986 0.983
(0.007) (0.007) (0.024) (0.023)
Size 0.006 0.006 0.014 0.014
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Income 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
AR(1) -1.93 -1.94 -1.95 -1.94
AR(2) 1.00 1.03 -0.19 -0.18
Hansen [0.082] [0.034] [0.079] [0.078]
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165
Riskt
Note: The estimator is one-step system GMM. Regressions (1) and (4)
include lagged dated t-2 and t-3 as instruments. Regressions (2) and (3)
include also lagged dated t-4. All regressions include time dummies. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation,
respectively. Hansen is a test of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM
estimators; it uses the minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM
estimators. The p-values are in the brackets.
Capitalt
Table 2.4: Controlling for Capital and Risk




jTY PEijt 1 REGijt 1 + (1  1)CAPit 1
+1xit + i + t + it (2.16)
where Typeij is a dummy equals one if bank i has type of ownership j and zero
otherwise.
Table 2.5 presents the results for the system GMM for capital-, risk-, and CAR
equations. There are no state-owned and foreign-owned banks that are under regu-
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latory pressure if we use RegPCA and therefore their interactive terms in Columns
(1), (3) and (5) drop out of the regressions. Moreover, the interactive terms for
joint-venture banks are dropped due to collinearity. All bank types are present in
regressions using RegPROB in Columns (2), (4) and (6).
For the capital equation, in Column (1) the coe¢ cient of RegPCA  Type is
statistically signicant for large private-domestic banks and signicant at 30 percent
level for regional-development banks. Large private-domestic banks appear to respond
the strongest to the capital requirement: Undercapitalized banks raise capital by Rp
1.8 billion more than joint-venture banks within one quarter, while the gure for
regional-development banks is only Rp 23 million.
The coe¢ cients of RegPROB  Type in Column (2) are signicant at 20 percent
level of signicance for state-owned and joint-venture banks only. It is negative for
state banks, however.
For the risk equation, in Column (3) the coe¢ cients of RegPCAType are statis-
tically insignicant. The coe¢ cients of RegPROB  Type in Column (4) are statisti-
cally signicant for state-owned and regional-development banks. For the former, it
is positive however, while for the latter it is economically small.
For the CAR equation in Column (5), similar picture appears: Most of the positive
impact of regulatory pressure on CAR comes from undercapitalized large private-
domestic banks. Small private-domestic- and regional-development banks seem to
behave like other adequately capitalized banks.
The coe¢ cients of RegPROB Type in Column (6) are statistically signicant for
state-owned and joint-venture banks while they are signicant at 20 percent level for
small private-domestic- and regional-development banks. Most of them are negative,
however, especially for the state banks. The results in Column (6) suggest that, al-
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Dep. Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regt-1*Type
State -0.239 0.367 -31.339
(0.194) (0.186) (2.081)
Large private 1.839 0.032 -0.057 -0.101 28.177 -0.886
(0.201) (0.047) (0.466) (0.195) (4.885) (6.393)
Small private 0.002 -0.029 0.003 -0.059 5.404 6.246
(0.010) (0.026) (0.017) (0.094) (8.676) (4.832)
Development -0.012 0.006 -0.022 -0.172 -0.599 2.079
(0.012) (0.018) (0.022) (0.104) (1.639) (1.388)
Joint venture -0.174 0.001 -9.250
(0.070) (0.108) (3.988)








Size -0.004 0.017 0.012 0.017 -0.312 -0.247
(0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.018) (0.074) (0.218)
Income 0.007 -0.002 0.006 0.001 0.098 0.075
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.026) (0.068)
AR(1) -2.19 -1.74 -1.97 -1.99 -2.75 -2.85
AR(2) 1.56 1.15 1.66 -0.13 0.31 -0.78
Hansen [0.084] [0.574] [0.071] [0.583] [0.106] [0.634]
Observations 1,924 2,164 1,924 2,164 1,924 2,164
Note: The estimator is one-step system GMM. All regressions include lagged dated t-2 and t-3 as
instruments, bank's size and income as well as time dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
For regressions (1), (3) and (5) we use RegPCA as the proxy for regulatory pressure. For other
regressions we use RegPROB.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, respectively. Hansen is a
test of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators; it uses the minimized value of the
corresponding two-step GMM estimators. The p-values are in the brackets.
Capitalt Riskt CARt
Table 2.5: Heterogenous Responses
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lowing heterogeneous responses, many of state-owned and joint-venture banks appear
to have too high capital ratios, and therefore tend to reduce their CAR even though,
by our denition, they are under regulatory pressure.
2.6.6 Interpretation
There is some evidence that banks comply with the capital requirement. First,
banks increase their capital ratio when their CAR is lower than, or approaching the
eight percent regulatory minimum. They do so primarily by raising capital, thus
increasing the numerator of CAR. Banks whose capital and risk, hence CAR, below
their own threshold, however, prefer reducing risk rather than increasing capital to
reach their own threshold.
However, some caveats are in order. First, most of the statistical signicance of
our results is low. This may be because some banks do not respond to the capi-
tal requirement su¢ ciently fast. Alternatively, it may be because our explanatory
variablesCapital, Risk, and CARsu¤er from measurement error, which leads to at-
tenuation bias. Therefore, our estimated coe¢ cients would be biased towards zero.
In either case, our results are too weak to be general.
Second, most of the impact of regulatory pressure on capital decision mostly comes
from large private-domestic banks. Other undercapitalized banks appear to respond
to the capital requirement like adequately capitalized banks.
This peculiarity may be because regulator supervises large private-domestic banks
more intensively. Moreover, some of these banks were bailout by the government in the
aftermath of the 1998 crises and their managers perhaps are under political pressure
to perform. A few of these banksbook turned red again during the period of analysis
and the government had to recapitalize them one more time.
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Third, our probabilistic measure of regulatory pressure, RegPROB, may be not
a good proxy, especially for the CAR equation in which we allow for heterogeneous
responses. When we use more homogenous sample, i.e. all private-domestic banks
only, however, the coe¢ cient of RegPROB is statistically signicant at 15 percent
level. Nevertheless, we will explore alternative measure of regulatory pressure as
robustness checks.
2.7 Robustness
2.7.1 More Homogeneous Samples
We estimate the basic regressions separately for some groups of bank types: all
banks except state-owned and foreign-owned banks, all private domestic- and joint-
venture banks, large private banks only, and small private banks only.11
Table 2.6 presents the results. For the most part, our results are quite robust. In
particular, we nd that large private domestic banks to be the most responsive to
the capital requirement. Moreover, overall, the coe¢ cients of RegPCA in the capital
equation, RegPROB in the risk equation, and both RegPCA and RegPROB in the
CAR equation become more signicant statistically.
2.7.2 Non-linearity in Regulatory Pressure
We allow banks who are signicantly undercapitalized to behave di¤erently by
introducing another dummy, CAR4 that equals one if banksCAR below four percent
and zero otherwise. We nd that these heavily undercapitalized banks respond the
strongest to the capital requirement: primarily by raising capital, and to lower extent
11Table (7)-(9) in the Appendix presents the results.
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Dep. Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RegPCAt-1 0.235 -0.008 6.678
(0.166) (0.079) (7.778)
RegPROBt-1 -0.004 (0.061) 1.220
(0.029) (0.047) (1.495)
Capitalt-1 0.753 0.739 0.977 0.980 0.848 0.837
(0.125) (0.138) (0.045) (0.044) (0.050) (0.046)
AR(1) -2.18 -2.15 -1.97 -1.97 -2.76 -2.81
AR(2) 1.51 1.50 1.69 1.64 0.42 0.44
Hansen [0.109] [0.099] (0.091) (0.095) (0.139) (0.123)
Observations 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,925
Capitalt Riskt CARt
Note: The estimator is one-step system GMM. All regressions include lagged dated t-2 and t-3 as
instruments, bank's size and income as well as time dummies. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, respectively. Hansen
is a test of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators; it uses the minimized value of
the corresponding two-step GMM estimators. The p-values are in the brackets.
Table 2.6: Homogeneous Samples
by reducing risk.
Table 2.7 presents the results. Controlling for CAR4, RegPCA continues being
statistically signicant, though economically it becomes much smaller. It equals 0.024,
which is much lower than the coe¢ cient of CAR4 which is 0.443.
We also estimate the regressions using an alternative dummy for regulatory pres-
sure. Following Jacques and Nigro (1997), we dene adequately capitalized dummy
REGA to be (1   1=CARit 1) and zero otherwise; and undercapitalized dummy
REGU to be (1=CARit   1) and zero otherwise. Overall, we nd that our basic
results are quite robust.12
We then estimate the basic regressions CAR4, REGPCA, and another dummy
for banks whose CAR is below 12 percent, CAR12. We also nd that our results are
quite robust.
12For brevity, we do not provide some of the results of robustness checks.
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Dep. Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reg
CAR<4 0.434 0.443 1.832 -0.012 -0.019 -0.036 -0.115 -0.019
(0.341) (0.344) (0.218) (0.013) (0.145) (0.136) (0.452) (0.009)
CAR<8 0.021 0.024 0.012 0.000 (0.001) 0.018
(0.015) (0.017) (0.010) (0.015) (0.026) (0.010)
Capitalt-1 0.768 0.780 0.867 0.942
(0.113) (0.115) (0.071) (0.015)
Riskt-1 0.977 0.976 0.969 0.82
(0.045) (0.047) (0.051) (0.038)
AR(1) -2.21 -2.18 -2.19 -1.79 -1.97 -1.85 -1.89 -2.09
AR(2) 1.51 1.52 1.61 0.64 1.69 1.79 1.83 -1.38
Hansen [0.092] [0.037] [0.011] [0.026] [0.079] [0.000] [0.135] [0.091]
Observations 1,925 1,224 581 643 1,925 1,224 581 643
No. of banks 126 80 39 41 126 80 39 41
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, respectively. Hansen is a test of the
overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators; it uses the minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM
estimators. The p-values are in the brackets.
Capitalt-1 Riskt-1
Note: The estimator is one-step system GMM. All regressions include lagged dated t-2 and t-3 as instruments, bank's size
and income as well as time dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
For regressions (1) and (5) we use a sample that include all banks except state banks and foreign banks; regressions (2) and
(6) private national banks only; regressions (3) and (7) large private national banks only; regressions (4) and (8) small private
national banks only.
Table 2.7: Non-linearity in Regulatory Pressure
2.7.3 Di¤erent Speed of Adjustment
To allow undercapitalized banks to have di¤erent speed of adjustment than ade-
quately capitalized ones, we add an interactive term between the regulatory pressure
and the lagged dependent variable such as the following:
CAPit = 1REGPCAit 1 + (1  0)REGPCAit 1  CAPit 1
+(1  1)CAPit 1 + 1xit + i + t + it (2.17)
Table 2.8 presents the results. We nd that undercapitalized banks have larger
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speed of capital adjustment. On the other hand, the speed of risk adjustment for both
undercapitalized- and adequately capitalized banks appears to be quite the same.
Dep. Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RegPCAt-1 -0.016 -0.023 -74.719 0.009 0.005 0.009 -0.892 -0.004
(0.016) (0.019) (2.346) (0.007) (0.024) (0.032) (3.086) (0.004)
RegPCAt-1*Capitalt-1 -0.556 -0.553 -22.212 0.123
(0.054) (0.063) (0.691) (0.013)
Capitalt-1 0.863 0.868 0.882 0.935
(0.062) (0.069) (0.059) (0.010)
RegPCAt-1*Riskt-1 -0.011 -0.020 0.116 0.075
(0.024) (0.072) (0.519) (0.046)
Riskt-1 0.977 0.976 0.969 0.816
(0.044) (0.047) (0.051) (0.039)
AR(1) -2.19 -2.15 -1.73 -1.80 -1.98 -1.86 -1.89 -2.07
AR(2) 1.58 1.62 1.27 0.67 1.66 1.80 1.82 -1.32
Hansen (0.000) (0.000) (0.234) (0.029) (0.075) (0.000) (0.136) (0.095)
Observations 1,925 1,224 581 643 1,925 1,224 581 643
No. of banks 126 80 39 41 126 80 39 41
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, respectively. Hansen is a test of the overidentifying
restrictions for the GMM estimators; it uses the minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM estimators. The p-values are
in the brackets.
Capitalt-1 Riskt-1
Note: The estimator is one-step system GMM. All regressions include lagged dated t-2 and t-3 as instruments, bank's size and
income as well as time dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
For regressions (1) and (5) we use a sample that include all banks except state banks and foreign banks; regressions (2) and (6)
private national banks only; regressions (3) and (7) large private national banks only; regressions (4) and (8) small private national
banks only.
Table 2.8: Di¤erent Speed of Adjustment
Overall, controlling for di¤erent speed of capital- and risk adjustment, the coe¢ -
cients of REGPCA continue to be quite robust.
2.7.4 Other Robustness Check
We introduce a dummy for public banks (TPublic), a dummy for banks sold
to strategic investors (TSold) into the basic regressions. We also use lagged risk-
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weighted assets (Riskit 1) in the capital equation and lagged capital (Capitalit 1)
in the risk equation. Overall, the coe¢ cients of regulatory pressure RegPCA and
RegPROB continue to be quite large and become more signicant statistically.
We drop the observations during the time when regulator imposes four percent
minimum capital requirement temporarily. Second, we also estimate the model using
di¤erent number of lagged variables as instruments in the GMM specications. Third,
to reduce the number of instruments in the GMM estimators, we reestimate the
regressions using yearly data only. Overall, our basic results are quite robust.
We could also estimate both capital- and risk equations using seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) model. Unfortunately, we are unaware of software package that
provides SUR estimation of dynamic panel data models. In any case, estimating
capital- and risk equations separately like the one we do here is consistent, though
less e¢ cient than estimating the equations using SUR model.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
We nd some evidence that regulator in developing countries like Indonesia
which had just gained its independence and are now still building its capacity to
regulate and supervise banks may be able to enforce capital requirement.
Because most of the statistical signicance of our results is low, our results are
too weak to be general. Moreover, though banks that are under regulatory pressure
tend to increase capital or reduce risk, di¤erent types of banks respond to the capital
requirement di¤erently. Among undercapitalized banks, only large private-national
banks that are under regulatory pressure that increase capital or reduce risk more
than adequately capitalized banks.
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Chapter 3
Does Selling Developing CountriesBanks
to Strategic Foreign Investors Improve
BanksPerformance?
3.1 Introduction
This essay examines the impact of selling Indonesian bailed-out banks to strategic
foreign investors on banksperformance. The central question is whether strategic
investors reduce bankscosts. How large is the average e¤ect of strategic sale on the
bankscosts? How does this e¤ect evolve over time? Does strategic sale improve other
measures of banksperformance such as return on assets or non-performing loans?
The focus of this essay is on overcoming problems in treatment evaluation. First,
we never observe counterfactuals and therefore we need to estimate them. Second,
typical analysis of the e¤ect of privatization may su¤er from selection bias. Investors
may "cherry pick" the most promising banks, and the government may sell only
the best banks to maximize revenue and these choices may not be orthogonal to
unobservable factors that a¤ect banksperformance.
Fortunately, the structure of our data, to some extent, reduces this potential source
of bias. Moreover, to control for time-invariant unobserved bankscharacteristics that
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may confound identication, we use panel data and di¤erence-in-di¤erence models.
Further, to address some potential biases in these latter models, we use generalized
di¤erence-in-di¤erence matching estimator.
To estimate the e¤ect of strategic sale on banks costs, in a regression of (the
logarithm of) banks costs on a translog function of banks outputs and prices of
inputs and bankstime-varying characteristics, we introduce a dummy for banks sold
to strategic investors. The coe¢ cient of this dummy would measure the average e¤ect
of strategic sale on the performance of banks sold to strategic investors (the average
e¤ect of treatment on the treated).
Our estimation of di¤erence-in-di¤erence models shows that strategic sale does
reduce bankscosts, and it does so quite signicant economically: On average, banks
sold to strategic investors have about 10-20 percent lower costs.
To eliminate potential biases in the di¤erence-in-di¤erence models, we combine
matching methods and di¤erence-in-di¤erence. Using observations in the common
support, we nd that the e¤ect of strategic sale continues to be quite large, about
four percent, though not statistically signicant because the number of observations
shrinks considerably. Using observations in a more relaxed denition of common
support, however, we nd strategic sale is associated with 11 percent lower costs.
A generalized kernel di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator also shows similar results.
Using observations in the relaxed denition of common support, we nd strategic sale
is associated with about 20 percent lower costs.
Evolution of the e¤ect of strategic sale shows banks sold to strategic investors
experience cost reduction every quarter since the second quarter the banks were sold;
and, by the end of the second year, they enjoy cumulative 12-16 percent lower costs.
We do some robustness checks. A generalized kernel di¤erence-in-di¤erence esti-
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mation of the e¤ect of strategic sale on other performance measures, using the more
relaxed denition of common support, shows that our results are quite robust: Strate-
gic sale is associated with higher banksreturn on assets or net interest margin and
with lower non-performing loans. We also get similar results when we estimate the
e¤ect of strategic sale using stochastic frontier analysis. Our results are quite robust
too when we focus on more homogenous banks, i.e. banks in the group of large private
national banks only.
This essay is organized as follows: In Section 3.2 we review related literature and
in Section 3.3 we briey describe the strategic sale of Indonesian banks. Section 3.4
presents our methodology. Section 3.5 describes the data and Section 3.6 discusses
empirical results. In Section 3.7 we do some robustness checks. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
This essays contribution is to o¤er some evidence, after overcoming problems in
treatment evaluation, that strategic sale of bailed-out banks in developing countries
like Indonesia does improve banksperformance.
There are some reasons why this is so. Foreign strategic investors may simply
bring modern banking practices and technology from their parent banks, and this new
technologies improve the performance of domestic banks they acquire. Moreover, new
investors may also employ better human capital which may further improve banks
e¢ ciency.1
Second, strategic investors take control of the banks, and hence are better able
to monitor banksmanagers. Corporate governance literature shows that managers
1See, for example, Buch (1997) for a discussion on the impact of foreign ownership on banks
performance in Central and Eastern Europe.
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may serve their own interest at the expense of ownerswelfare (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 2000). If ownership is concentrated, however, managers
may not easily capitalize their information advantages (Hart, 1983; Kane, 1999). The
free riding problem in monitoring which plagued small investors would be also less
severe (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 2000; Kane, 1999).
Of course banksprevious owner, the government, also has majority ownership.
However, it may not necessarily imply that the government could control banks
managers to improve banksperformance. If in fact government could control banks
managers, it could force the managers to nance government-favored projects at the
expense of banksprotability (Vickers and Yarrow, 1989). On the other hand, as
Alchian (1965) argues, because government owns these banks, it is all citizens of
the country who jointly own them, and therefore ownership is actually more widely
distributed.
Third, bailed-out banks may su¤er from the usual problems of public enterprises:
political intervention, corporate governance, and lack of competitors.2 These prob-
lems, however, may plague bailed out banks at lesser degree because, unlike typical
state-owned enterprises, government owns the banks for a short time only.
Some researchers have empirically looked at whether direct sale of banks to strate-
gic investors improve banksperformance. Clarke, Cull and Shirley (2005) provide
a recent survey of the literature. They nd that strategic sale may improve banks
performance, but it depends on whether the government keeps some shares of stock
in the banks.3
2See, for example, Shirley and Walsh (2000) for a survey of theoretical and empirical literature
on the e¤ect of privatization on rm performance.
3See also other relevant papers in this special edition of Journal of Banking and Finance on Bank
Privatization like Nakane and Weintraub (2005), Beck, Crivelli, and Summerhill (2005), Bonin,
Hasan and Wachtel (2005b), and Haber (2005).
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by gov't by owners1
State 7 7 7 4
Regional development 27 13 10 4 12
Private national 142 72 40 30 48 4 7 9
No. of
banks   Bank types
CAR Restructuring methods
Note: This table is adapted from Box 4 of Pangestu and Habir (2002). 1Owners of these banks injected new capital; the
government supplemented them.
Recapitalized…
>4% (-25%,4%) <-25% Closed Merged
Table 3.1: Indonesias Bank Restructuring
When the government keeps no shares of stocks in the banks, most researchers
nd that banksperformance is improved. However, when the government keeps a
minority share, the evidence is mixed: In some cases, strategic sale improves banks
performance, while in other cases it does not. If the government remains the ma-
jority shareholder, most researchers nd that strategic sale does not improve banks
performance.
This essay di¤ers from the literature in at least two respects. First, rather than
relying on stochastic frontier analysis only, we use di¤erence-in-di¤erence and match-
ing models to address the problems in treatment evaluation. Second, the structure of
our data, to some extent, reduces some potential sources of selection bias.
3.3 Strategic Sale of Indonesian Banks
In the aftermath of the 1998 nancial and banking crises, many of the 176 do-
mestically owned banks were heavily undercapitalized. The capital adequacy ratios
(CARs) of all seven state banks were lower than -25 percent. One in two regional-
development banks and private national banks had its CAR lower than four percent.
One in ve private national banks had its CAR lower than -25 percent.
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The government of Indonesia, through its Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency
(IBRA), restructured these banks. IBRA categorized these banks into three groups:
banks whose CARs are above 4 percent; banks whose CARs are between 4 percent
and -25 percent; and banks whose CARs are less than -25 percent (see Table 3.1).
The rst group of banks is exempted from the program and may continue operating.
However, unless their owners su¢ ciently increase their bankscapital, IBRA might
take over or close banks in the other two groups.4 By the end of 1998, IBRA had
closed 48 private domestic banks; recapitalized all 7 state banks and merged 4 of them
into one; recapitalized 12 regional-development banks; and recapitalized 11 private
national banks and merged 9 others into one bank.
This bank restructuring makes the government the dominant player in the banking
industry. On top of all state banks, IBRA also controls six previously privately owned
banks.5 Pangestu and Habir (2002) estimate that by 2000 the government owns about
85 percent of Indonesian banking industriesthird party liabilities.
However, this banking overhaul costs government budget severely. In the year
2000, the government had to service debt that is more than 100 percent of GDP and
to nance a budget decit that is more than four percent of GDP. Facing this large
scal decit, the government simply has to sell all six recapitalized private-national
banks.
The burden of budget decit and the scrutiny of IMF arguably dictate govern-
ments decision to sell these banks to strategic foreign investors. Cherry picking by
investors consequently is not as ubiquitous as those in other countries. During the
4IBRAs policies had not always been consistent, however. Some argue that IBRAs mishaps
might actually aggravate Indonesias banking problems. See, for example, Pangestu and Habir
(2002) for the details.
5These latter banks are Bank Danamon Indonesia, Bank Permata, Bank Central Asia, Bank
Internasional Indonesia, Bank Niaga, and Bank Lippo. The rst two banks are merged with other
banks taken over by IBRA.
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period of analysis, with an exception of one private bank, banks sold to strategic
foreign investors are the recapitalized private banks only. The government does not
sell its best banks to maximize revenue either. The recapitalized state-owned banks
and regional-development banks are not for sale to strategic investors.
It is true that the sale draws public controversies. Some members of the lower
house also oppose governments decision to sell these banks. In fact, a number of times
the government delays banksscheduled sales, though it is not necessarily always due
to public opposition. However, in the end, the government sells all and only the six
recapitalized private banks to strategic foreign investors.
To summarize, the 1998 nancial crises hands over many private national banks
into governments control. The government closes some of the worst banks, and
recapitalizes some of the best among the worst. To nance the budget decit, the
government sells all and only these banks to strategic foreign investors. Therefore, the
government does not systematically choose which banks it sells to maximize revenue.
Investors, on the other hand, can buy these banks only because no other banks are
for sale. Hence, compared to some of bank sales analyzed in the literature, cherry
picking on Indonesian banks is arguably less of a problem.
3.4 Methodology
We evaluate the impact of strategic sale on banksperformance: How large the
average e¤ect of strategic sale on the costs of banks sold to strategic foreign investors
is (i.e. the average e¤ect of treatment on the treated).
The dependent variable in our analysis is the logarithm of banks costs. The
explanatory variables are a dummy for strategic sale that equals one if the bank
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is sold to strategic foreign investors and a control of translog6 cost function and a
vector of bankstime-varying characteristics. Given that identication is possible and
estimation method is appropriate, the coe¢ cient of the dummy would capture the
average e¤ect of strategic sale.
3.4.1 Identication
Identication of the average e¤ect of strategic sale may not be possible if the sale
decision is not exogenous. Investors may "cherry pick" the most promising banks,
and this choice may not be orthogonal to unobservable factors that a¤ect banks
performance such as banksreputation or corporate culture. Likewise, to maximize
revenue, the government may choose to sell the best banks only and this decision is
correlated with unobservable factors that a¤ect bankscosts. If this is the case, the
correlation between strategic sale and banksperformance would be confounded with
the e¤ect of, for example, banksintangible assets.
Fortunately, the circumstances of the sale, and hence, the structure of our data,
to some extent, reduces these potential sources of bias: The government simply has
to sell these banks within a short time.
In any case, unobservable characteristics that may confound identication are
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where yi is the value of output i and wj is the price of input j.
45
most likely those that vary across banks but xed over time. To control for this
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, we use panel data and estimate di¤erence-
in-di¤erence models.
We specify the di¤erence-in-di¤erence model as a two-way xed e¤ect regression
model as follows:7
cit = Sit + f(xit; ) + zit + i + t + it (3.1)
where cit is the logarithm of bank is costs in period t, Sit is a dummy variable equals
one if bank i in period t is owned by strategic investors, f(xit; ) is a translog cost
function where xit is a vector of arguments of the cost function of bank i at time t, zit
is a vector of time-varying bank is characteristics at time t, i is bank is xed e¤ects,
and t is time e¤ects at time t. The banksxed e¤ects would capture time-invariant
characteristics unique to bank i. The time e¤ects would proxy all common factors
that a¤ect costs of all banks in period t uncontrolled for in Equation (3.1).
The error term it is banks time-varying error, assumed to be distributed inde-
pendently of i and t. However, the error it may be correlated across bank and
time. To address potential biases in the estimation of standard errors, we estimate
Huber/White heteroskedasticity robust standard error as well as standard error ad-
justed for intra-group correlation.
7We write banks costs as a function of a vector of observable variables x and unobservable
variable u:
c1t = g1 (x) + u1t and c0t = g0 (x) + u0t
where c1t is the banks costs at time t if the bank was sold to strategic investors, and c0t is the banks
costs if the bank had not been sold. If the expected conditional costs only di¤er by a constant ,
i.e. g1 (x) = + g0 (x) and u1t = u0t, then the general di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator
b' = E (c1t   c1t0 jx;D = 1)  E (c0t   c0t0 jx;D = 0)
reduces to  in the two-way xed e¤ect model, where t0 is pretreatment period, t is post-treatment
period, and D equals one if the banks sold to strategic investors during the period of analysis and
zero otherwise.
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Our primary interest is therefore on the sign and magnitude of , the coe¢ cient
of strategic sale dummy. We want to compare bankscosts when the banks are owned
by strategic investors to the counterfactual that the banks are still in the hands of
domestic owners. We never observe the latter, however. In this model, as an estimate
of counterfactual we use the changes in control group before and after intervention.
We then could interpret  as the di¤erence between outcomes in the treated group
before and after the intervention and the corresponding changes in counterfactual, i.e.
the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimate of the average e¤ect of strategic sale on banks
costs.
3.4.2 Heterogeneous Treatment E¤ects
In Equation (3.1) we assume that the impact of strategic sale is homogenous
across banks. If treatment e¤ects are heterogeneous, the di¤erence-in-di¤erence esti-
mates may su¤er from two additional sources of bias (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd
1997). First, bias may arise if there is no bank in the control group that is compara-
ble to banks in the treated groups and vice versa. Second, the estimate may also be
biased if the distribution of vector of observable variables that a¤ect bankscosts in
the treated group is di¤erent from that in the control group.
We address these two potential sources of bias using matching estimator: We pair
each strategic foreign-owned banks with a corresponding control group, i.e. some
domestically owned banks whose characteristics are similar. Comparing the treated
groups with control group with similar characteristics eliminates the rst bias. Re-
weighting the control group observations in the estimation eliminates the second bias.
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we match treated and untreated banks
using their propensity scores which are dened as the conditional probability of receiv-
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ing treatment given observable pretreatment characteristics x, i.e. P (x) = Pr(D =
1jx). Conditional on P (x), we assume that the counterfactual outcome distribution
of treated banks is the same as the observed outcome distribution of the controls.
We estimate a logit model of the probability that a domestically owned bank was
acquired by strategic foreign investors during the period of analysis as a function
of some pretreatment characteristics. We then use the logit model to predict the
propensity score, the probability that a bank will be sold to strategic investors.
We construct the set of treated and control observations, the common support,
in two ways. First, which we call Common Support 1, we drop observations whose
propensity scores do not overlap across treated- and control groups. Second, which
we call Common Support 2, we exclude all observations whose propensity scores are
higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity scores of the controls.
Using observation on each of these common supports only, we reestimate the
di¤erence-in-di¤erence model.
Then, we also estimate the average treatment e¤ect on the treated using match-
ing estimator. We use the generalized di¤erence-in-di¤erence matching estimator
proposed by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) which extends the conventional
matching estimator to panel data. Hence, by controlling for bank-xed e¤ects, we
allow that selection into treatment may depend on time-invariant unobservable vari-
ables.8





8<:(Y1ti   Y1t0i)  X
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Wij (Y0ti   Y0t0i)
9=;
where (Y1ti   Y1i0i) is a treated bank is di¤erences in outcome Y after and before intervention
period while
P
iI0\SpWij (Y0ti   Y0i0i) is the weighted sum of the di¤erences in outcome Y after
and before intervention period of banks in the control group I0 among the common support Sp which
are matched to bank i. These di¤erence-in-di¤erences are then averaged across all treated banks I1
in the common support. The weights Wij are
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3.4.3 Main Hypothesis
We take as the null hypothesis that, controlling for relevant explanatory variables,
the costs of banks sold to strategic investors are the same as those which are not. We
therefore state our main hypothesis as follows:
H : Strategic sale does not a¤ect bankscosts.
A negative and large absolute value of  would be against of our hypothesis, i.e.
banks sold to strategic investors experience cost reduction. A positive and large 
would, on the other hand, suggest that these banks experience deteriorating cost
performance.
3.5 Data
Like in the essay in Chapter 2, we use the quarterly nancial statement of Indone-
sian banking industry which covers 132 Indonesian banks for the periods since the
fourth quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2005.
We include all banks in our sample, except foreign-owned banks, and joint-venture
banks. These two types of banks are not subject to strategic sale because they have
been owned by foreign investors already.9
All of the banks sold to strategic foreign investors are "large private national"














where G(:) is a kernel function which we dened as Gaussian, Ps are the propensity scores, and
bn is a bandwidth parameter.
9Our results are robust even if we include foreign and joint venture banks in our sample.
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Ownership Number of banks
State owned 5
Large private national 35
Always domestically owned 29
Sold to strategic investors 6





Table 3.2: Change in Ownership of Banks, 2000-2005
basic regressions, we include other types of domestically owned banks as well. There-
fore, along with the 35 "large private national" banks, we also have 5 state banks, 37
"small private national" banks, and 26 regional-development banks.1011
3.5.1 Dependent Variable
As the dependent variable, cit, we use the logarithm of banks costs which is
the sum of banksoperating and non-operating costs reported in the banksincome
statement. The operating costs include, among others, interest expenses, general and
administrative expenses, and personnel expenses.
10"Large private national" banks may trade foreign currencies while "small private national" banks
may not. Both types are domestically owned banks. The regional development banks are owned
by provincial governments. Therefore, they are like state bank though they are typically small. We
exclude the regional development bank of Timor Timur from the sample because Timor Leste now
is an independent state.
11Later, to check the robustness of our results, we also focus on samples with more homogenous
banks.
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3.5.2 Strategic Sale Dummy
The strategic sale dummy, Sit, equals one if bank i in period t is owned by strate-
gic investors. We follow the changes in banksownership from the information on the
composition of shareholders reported in the banksquarterly nancial statement. For
the cases in which this information is not available, we gather news about the sale
in Indonesian newspapers. The Letter of Intent of the Government of Indonesia pub-
lished at the IMFs website also provides progress reports on the sale of some of the
banks.
3.5.3 Cost Function
As the arguments of the cost function, f(xit; ), we use banksdeposits, loans,
and a measure of unit price. Banksdeposits and loans are, respectively, the sum of
all type of deposits and loans reported in the banksbalance sheet. As a measure of
unit price, we use the banksoperating costs divided by banksassets.
All arguments of the cost function enter as their logarithm. The cost functions take
the translog form, and hence, they enter the regressions as the sum of the logarithm
of banks loans, deposits, and unit price as well as their square terms, and their
interactive terms.
3.5.4 Other Control Variables
In some specications, we also include some time-varying bank characteristics,
zit, that may a¤ect bankscosts such as banksliquidity, non-performing loans and




Strategic sale -0.31 -0.15 -0.12
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Public bank dummy No Yes Yes
Translog cost function No Yes Yes
Time-varying characteristics No No Yes
Observations 1,885 1,870 1,682
R2 0.07 0.98 0.98
Full Sample
Note: All regressions include time and bank fixed effects. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
Table 3.3: Basic Results
tion of non-performing loan to productive assets, and banksCAR.12
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Basic Results
Table 3.3 presents the estimation results for the impact of strategic sale on the
percentage change in bankscosts using di¤erence-in-di¤erence models.13 Column (1)
reports the results for a model including strategic sale dummy and time- and bank
xed e¤ects only. We nd that strategic sale is associated with 31 percent lower costs.
Banks, however, use di¤erent types of technology and this may a¤ect how banks
reduce their costs over the period of analysis. We therefore control for bankstech-
nology by introducing a translog cost function into the model. Second, we also allow
12The summary statistics of some key variables are in Tables A.2 and A.7 in the Appendix.
13According to Halvorsen and Palmquist (1981), we cannot interpret the coe¢ cient of strategic
sale dummy in a semi-logarithmic functional form like Equation 3.1 as the percentage impact of
strategic sale on bankscosts. They suggest that the correct percentage impact is eb   1. However,
for the ranges of b we have here, they do not di¤er much. Hence, we continue interpreting  as
percentage impact of strategic sale on costs.
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listed banks to have di¤erent intercept by adding a dummy which equals one if banks
are listed publicly.
Controlling for these variables, the estimated impact of strategic sale remains
large 15 percent (Column 2). Both this estimate and the previous one are statisti-
cally signicant at one percent level.
We further control for some observed time-varying bank characteristics that may
a¤ect bankscosts such as banksliquidity, non-performing loans and capital ratio.
We nd that strategic sale continues to be associated with lower costs, on average by
12 percent at ve percent level statistical signicance (Column 3).14
3.6.2 Matching and Di¤erence-in-di¤erence
We estimate the propensity scores using a logit model of strategic sale as a
function of pretreatment characteristics. We take the pretreatment characteristics to
be bankscharacteristics in the rst period, which is the last quarter of 2000. For the
cases in which bankscharacteristics are not available this period, we use their value
in the next period, the rst quarter of 2001.
We experiment with a number of pretreatment characteristics. The basics are the
arguments of the translog cost function. We also add some measures of bankspre-
treatment performance such as banksliquidity, protability, capital ratio and non-
performing loans. Many of these variables turn out to be statistically insignicant,
however. In the end, we use the simpler Cobb-Douglass cost function only as the
pretreatment characteristics.
Table 3.4 Columns (1-3) and (5-7) shows the results of combined matching and
di¤erence-in-di¤erence models when we restrict our sample to observations in common
14The three additional time-varying bank characteristics, however, are statistically insignicant.
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support only. The rst set of three columns is for Common Support 1 and the second
set of columns are for Common Support 2.
Using observations in Common Support 1, the sample now includes ten banks
only, and the number of observations falls drastically to less than 180. For our basic
specication, i.e. controlling for bankstechnology and public banksdummy (Column
2), we nd strategic sale is associated with four percent lower costs, though now it
is not statistically signicant. We nd similar results when we introduce additional
observed time-varying bank characteristics (Column 3). Like those in basic results in
Table 3.3, these additional control variables are statistically insignicant.
Using observation in Common Support 2, we keep most of the observations in the
original sample. For the basic specication, we nd that strategic sale is associated
with 16 percent lower costs (Column 6). After controlling further for banksliquidity,
non-performing loans and capital ratio, the impact of strategic sale falls to 11 percent
(Column 7). They are statistically signicant respectively at one percent and ten
percent level.15
3.6.3 Non-parametric Matching
We relax the assumption of linear relationship by estimating the average e¤ect of
strategic sale using semi-nonparametric matching estimators. Table 3.4 Columns (4)
and (8) shows the average treatment e¤ect on the treated of strategic sale on banks
costs using the generalized di¤erence-in-di¤erence kernel matching estimator.
Using observations in Common Support 1, we nd that the average treatment
e¤ect on the treated to be positive, though it is not statistically signicant (Column






































































































































































































































































































































































































4). Using observations in Common Support 2, however, strategic sale is associated
with 21 percent lower costs and statistically signicant (Column 8).
3.6.4 Interpretation
Using both the di¤erence-in-di¤erence and combined matching and di¤erence-
in-di¤erence estimators, we nd that strategic sale is associated with cost reduction.
There is therefore some evidence that strategic investors do improve the performance
of banks they acquired from domestic owners.
Some caveats, however, are in order. First, even though most of our estimates are
statistically signicant, they are not if we use observations in the Common Support
1 only. Our only defense is that these estimates are imprecise. Using observations in
Common Support 1 only, the sample size drastically falls while we have more than
one hundred bank-xed and time-xed e¤ects in the regressions.
Second, our di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimators rely on whether the change in banks
costs in the control group is an unbiased estimate of the counterfactual. The reliability
of our estimates depends much on whether this assumption is satised.
In other words, consistent estimation of the average e¤ect of treatment on the
treated, , in Equation (3.1) requires the changes in control group is an unbiased
estimate of the counterfactual. Hence, we need to satisfy the two underlying as-
sumptions of di¤erence-in-di¤erence models: The time e¤ects t are common across
treated and control groups, and the composition of treated and control groups are
stable before and after the intervention.
Because we use panel data and eliminate i by di¤erencing, we satisfy the second
assumption. We cannot directly test whether the change in bankscosts in the control
group is an unbiased estimate of the counterfactual. Instead, in the next section,
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we test whether treated and control groups have the same time e¤ects before the
intervention. If they have common time trend before the intervention, then it is likely
that they would have been the same trend after the intervention should the treated
banks are not sold to strategic investors.
3.6.5 Common Time Trend Assumption
To test common time trend assumption formally, using only observations in the




tDit + f(xit; ) + zit + i + t + it (3.2)
where Dit is a dummy variable equals one if bank i is eventually sold to foreign
investors sometime during the period of analysis.
The coe¢ cients of interest are the t which measure period t specic outcome
di¤erences between the treated- and control group prior to intervention. If we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that t are jointly equal to zero, then the pretreatment
trends in the treated group are statistically similar to those in the control group.
Our results in Table 3.5 are, however, mixed: Even though we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that ts are jointly equal to zero, we also cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that they are jointly positive. In fact, some individual estimates are positive
and statistically signicant (Columns 1 and 3). For cases in which they are negative,
the estimates are statistically insignicant.
Figure 3.1, the 95 percent condence interval of the estimates for the full sample
(Column 1 of Table 3.5), illustrates this idea more clearly. The estimates of the time
e¤ect are statistically signicant only in the rst four quarters and the thirteenth











1st 3rd 5th 7th 9th 11th 13th
Figure 3.1: The 95 Percent Condence Interval of Pre-intervention Time E¤ects
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Dependent variable: ln(cost)




Quarter 1 0.25 -0.13 0.25
(0.06) (0.10) (0.06)
Quarter 2 0.14 -0.20 0.15
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06)
Quarter 3 0.15 -0.15 0.16
(0.06) (0.14) (0.07)
Quarter 4 0.13 -0.10 0.15
(0.06) (0.10) (0.05)
Quarter 5 0.05 -0.12 0.05
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Quarter 6 0.15 -0.08 0.15
(0.12) (0.04) (0.11)
Quarter 7 -0.12 -0.17 -0.11
(0.11) (0.07) (0.12)
Quarter 8 -0.11 -0.23 -0.09
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
Quarter 9 -0.07 -0.21 -0.06
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Quarter 10 -0.01 -0.12 -0.02
(0.08) (0.11) (0.09)
Quarter 11 0.05 -0.03 0.06
(0.05) (0.09) (0.05)
Quarter 12 0.02 -0.03 0.04
(0.07) (0.10) (0.06)
Quarter 13 0.10 0.13 0.12
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Quarter 14 -0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.02) 0.00 (0.02)
Quarter 15 0.00 0.04 0.00
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Observations 1,825 133 1,732
F-statistics 30.32 9.89 54.89
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
R2 0.94 0.98 0.95
Note: All regressions include public bank dummy, translog cost function as well as time and bank
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3.5: Common Time-trend Assumption
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statistically di¤erent from zero at ve percent level of signicance.
These results therefore cannot conrm our implicit assumption that the time ef-
fects t are common across treated and control group during the pre-intervention
period. It appears that, in some periods, banks that are eventually sold to strategic
investors have higher costs compared to other banks.
We, however, could still interpret our previous estimates as a lower bound of
the e¤ect of strategic sale on banks costs. We have shown that strategic sale is
associated with about 15 percent cost reduction. The actual e¤ect of strategic sale
on cost reduction may be larger.
3.7 Robustness
3.7.1 Evolution of Treatment E¤ects
To explore the evolution of the impact of strategic sale over time, we modify
Equation (3.1) by dropping strategic sale dummy and introducing some dummies for




mSm + f(xit; ) + zit + i + t + it (3.3)
where Sm is a dummy equals one for banks which are owned by foreign investors and
the banks are in their m-th quarter(s) after the acquisition.
The coe¢ cient m captures the average e¤ect of strategic sale in period m after
the bank is sold. Each m would tell us what happen to bankscosts in each period:
The coe¢ cient 0, for example, would be the e¤ect of strategic sale in the quarter
when the bank is sold and 1 would be the e¤ect one quarter later. All of these ms
would also provide a picture of how the e¤ect of strategic sale changes over time,
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whether cost reduction happens immediately after the banks are sold or a few years
later as found by some researchers.
Table 3.6 presents the estimation results. First, we include the dummies for the
quarter the bank is sold and the three following quarters (henceforth we call this
"acquisition quarter", "one quarter later", "two quarters later", and "three quarters
later" dummies respectively). We nd that strategic sale is associated with cost
reduction about 1 percent in the acquisition quarter, and a cumulative 5, 8, and 12
percent in the three following quarters respectively (Column 1).16
Further, when we include the dummies for every quarter during the period of two
years since the sale, we nd that strategic sale continues to be associated with cost
reduction. Over time, the e¤ect of strategic sale increases, from 4 percent reduction
in the acquisition quarter to a cumulative 12 percent cost reduction by the end of the
second year (Column 2).17
We nd similar results when we control for bankstime-varying characteristics:
Strategic sale leads to a cumulative one-year 7 percent cost reduction and a two-year 9
percent cost reduction.18 The additional control variables continue to be statistically
signicant.19
Focusing on observations in the common support, the cumulative two-year cost
reductions are 5 percent using Common Support 1 (Column 4) and 16 percent using
Common Support 2 (Column 6). The rst estimate is not statistically signicant,
however.
These results overall are in line with those using di¤erence-in-di¤erence models.
16The rst quarter e¤ect is not statistically signicant while the others are statistically signicant
at ve percent level.
17All dummies now statistically signicant at ve percent except the dummy for the rst quarter
which continues to be statistically insignicant.
18For brevity, we do not provide the results.
19In what follows, we will drop the time-varying characteristics from our regressions.
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Dependent variable: ln(cost)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Acquisition quarter -0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
One quarter later -0.05 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Two quarters later -0.08 -0.11 -0.04 -0.06 -0.11 -0.14
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Three quarters later -0.12 -0.15 -0.08 -0.09 -0.15 -0.19
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Four quarters later -0.12 -0.03 -0.17
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Five quarters later -0.11 -0.06 -0.17
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
Six quarters later -0.14 -0.03 -0.20
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Seven quarters later -0.12 -0.05 -0.16
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Observations 1,870 1,870 178 178 1,764 1,764
R2 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.95
Full Sample Using obs. inCommon Support 1
Using obs. in
Common Support 2
Note: All regressions include public bank dummy, translog cost function as well as time and bank fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3.6: The E¤ect of Strategic Sale Overtime
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ROA (1) 0.19 (2.78)
NIM (2) 0.24 (1.16)
NPL (3) -3.81 (5.79)
ROA (4) 0.98 (1.12)
NIM (5) 0.95 (0.95)
NPL (6) -8.60 (3.36)
Note: Standard errors for estimates using observations in Common Support 2 are







Table 3.7: Matching with Other Performance Measures
During the quarter when banks are sold to strategic investors, there is no change in
bankscosts. Over time, however, bankscosts fall and, by the end of the second year
after acquisition, cost reduction could be as large as 12-16 percent.
3.7.2 Matching with other Performance Measures
To see whether these results are robust to banksother performance measures, we
also estimate the average e¤ect of treatment on the treated on return on assets (ROA),
net-interest margin (NIM), and the proportion of non-performing loans (NPL) using
the di¤erence-in-di¤erence kernel matching estimator.
Table 3.7 presents the results. Using observations in Common Support 1, the signs
of our estimates are as we expect: Strategic sale is associated with higher ROA or NIM
and with lower NPL (Rows 1-3 of Table 3.7). These estimates are not statistically
signicant however.
Using observations in Common Support 2, again we obtain the expected signs of
the estimates, though they continue to be statistically insignicant except for NPL
(Rows 4-6 of Table 3.7). If these gures are of any guide, strategic sale is associated
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with one percentage point larger ROA or NIM and 3.5 percentage point lower NPL.
3.7.3 More Homogenous Samples
To have more homogenous samples, we consider private banks only. We esti-
mate Equation (3.2) using both di¤erence-in-di¤erence and combine matching and
di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimators.
Dependent variable: ln(cost)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strategic sale -0.12 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Time-varying characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,345 1,254 124 124 647 596
R2 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.96
Full Sample Using obs. inCommon Support 1
Using obs. in
Common Support 2
Note: All regressions include public bank dummy, translog cost function as well as time and bank fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3.8: More Homogenous Samples
Table 3.8 presents the results. Overall, we nd that our results are quite robust:
Strategic sale is associated with 8-12 percent of cost reduction.
3.7.4 Using Frontier Analysis
We estimate the e¤ect of strategic sale on bankscost e¢ ciency using standard
frontier analysis, alternatingly by assuming that technology is time invariant and time
variant.20 We present some of the results in Table 3.9.
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Dependent variable: ln(cost)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strategic sale -0.29 -0.22 -0.36 -0.15 -0.35 -0.28
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) 0.28
Time invariant inefficiency Yes - Yes - Yes -
Time variant inefficiency - Yes - Yes - Yes
Observations 1,870 1,870 178 178 1,764 1,764
Full Sample Using obs. inCommon Support 1
Using obs. in
Common Support 2
Table 3.9: Stochastic Frontier Analysis
In all specications, we nd that strategic sale is associated with lower costs with
estimated e¤ect ranging from 15-35 percent. Even when we use observations in the
Common Support 1 only, the estimate of the e¤ect of strategic sale is now statistically
signicant at one percent level.
3.8 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that, after overcoming problems in treatment evaluation, strategic
sale of banks in developing country like Indonesia does lead to cost reduction.
Economically, the cost reduction is quite large, both right after the banks are sold
and over time since then. On average, depending on the specication, strategic sale
is associated with 10-20 percent lower costs. Looking at the evolution of the e¤ect of
strategic sale, bankscosts reduce over time.
These results are quite robust to other estimators such as combined matching
and di¤erence-in-di¤erence, generalized di¤erence-in-di¤erence kernel matching, and
stochastic frontier analysis. They are robust too to di¤erent types of samples. We
20We use the Batesse and Coelli (1995)s stochastic frontier models.
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The E¤ectiveness of Capital Requirement
when Regulator does not Observe Banks
Capital and Investment Decision
4.1 Introduction
In a simple theoretical model, this essay examines how regulators in developing
countries, which may not observe banks capital and investment decision, enforce
capital requirement.
The central question is whether, in such circumstances, regulator could enforce
capital requirement. Is auditing banksbalance sheet necessary? Does audit policy
di¤er if regulator does not observe bankscapital, investment decision, or both capital
and investment decision? How important is audit if regulator has no access to ex-post
veriable information regarding bankscapital and investment decision?
Regulator implements capital requirement to limit banksrisk taking. This regula-
tion dictates that if banks want to invest in risky assets, they have to keep su¢ ciently
large amount of capital. In general, regulator requires banks to maintain capital at
least eight percent of their risk-weighted assets.1
1See Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 for more discussion on capital requirement.
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Researchers are debating whether capital requirement could in fact prevent banks
from taking excessive risk. However, we will not enter this debate here. Instead, we
focus on a simpler question: Can regulators enforce capital requirement?
We build a simple model of a relationship between a regulator and a representative
bank in a principal-agent framework. We look at the case of symmetric information
as the benchmark. Then we examine the cases in which regulator does not observe
banks capital, investment decision, and both capital and investment decision. First,
we examine what happens if regulator is unable to audit banks balance sheet. Then
we see how the results change if regulator could audit banks book.
We nd that, in the case of asymmetric information problem, without auditing
banks balance sheet, regulator cannot enforce capital regulation. If regulator ob-
serves banks investment decision but not its capital, regulator needs to audit bank
that invests in risky assets only with a strictly positive probability. If regulator
observes banks capital but not its investment decision, regulator needs to audit low-
capitalized bank only. However, if regulator does not observe both banks capital
and its investment decision, regulator has to audit all types of bank with a strictly
positive probability.
This essay is organized as follows: In Section 4.2, we review related literature.
Section 4.3 explains the model and Section 4.4 discusses the results. Section 4.5
concludes and discusses some extensions.
4.2 Related Literature
Literature shows that, if regulator observes banks capital, regulator may use
it as an instrument to enforce capital requirement. These results may t banking
industries in developed countries. However, in developing countries, regulator and
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market participants perhaps nd it more di¢ cult to address asymmetric information
problems. Therefore, regulator in developing countries may not observe bankscapital
and investment decision, at least not as good as regulator does in developed countries.
We draw on two strands of literature: literature on capital regulation and audit-
ing. In the rst strand of literature, Giammarino, Lewis and Sappington (1993), for
example, present a model of bank regulation in which bank has private information
about its assets inherent risk and e¤ort-enhancing quality. However, they assume
that the total quality of loan is observable appealing to the practice that regulator
frequently inspects banksassets and operation, or that regulator may have access to
ex-post veriable information.
They show that, to overcome informational problems regulator should choose the
amount of deposit insurance premium, reserves, capital, and loan contingent on the
asset quality. They also nd that, under socially optimal insurance scheme, asset
quality is below the rst-best level and higher quality bank has larger asset bases and
faces lower capital requirements.
This essay is also related to the literature on audit in the line of Townsend (1979)
or Gale and Hellwig (1985). In the context of bank regulation, Campbell, Chan and
Marino (1992), for example, show that there is substitutability between monitoring
and capital requirements. In an optimal regulation, banks capital structure and
regulators monitoring expenditure are jointly determined.
Bhattacharya et al. (2002) demonstrate that a combination of capital replenish-
ment, closure, and auditing regulation could eliminate risk-taking behavior as long
as bank is solvent. They also nd that higher frequency of bank auditing allows the
regulator to close banks at lower asset values without adverse e¤ects. Milne and















Figure 4.1: The Timeline of the Game
audits banks, show that banks with su¢ cient franchise value maintain a bu¤er of
capital in excess of regulatory minimum.2
4.3 The Model
We consider the relationship between a regulator and a representative bank in a
principal-agent framework. Figure 4.1 shows how the game unfolds.
At the outset, regulator announces bank regulation, i.e. minimum capital require-
ment and audit policy. Regulator requires bank to keep su¢ ciently large capital if it
wants to invest in risky assets. Regulator may also audit banks balance sheet to see
whether bank reports truthfully.
We use ex-ante contracting to capture the notion that regulator has implemented
bank regulation when, at some point in time during banks operation, bank may
observe hidden information and exercise hidden action. For simplicity, we rule out
any ex-ante hidden information, however.
2See Chapter 2 for literature review on capital requirement.
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In the beginning of period of interest, the bank privately observes its capital.
We motivate this assumption as follows: The bank collects deposits D which are
observable to the regulator. At the same time, the bank privately observes the current
(market) value of its loan extended in the previous period, L. By denition, the banks
capital is the residual of the balance sheet, K = L D: The bank privately observes
the value of banks loan, and hence, its capital.
The bank can be of two types: high- or low capitalized. The key assumption is the
non-observability of the current value of banks loan. The loan in the previous period
may turn out to be a success or a failure. Because regulator does not continuously
audit banks balance sheet, regulator may not know the current market value of the
loan. Therefore, the bank, for example, may pretend to be high-capitalized bank and
invest in risky assets even though it is in fact low capitalized.
If banks projects succeed, the value of banks loan is high, and the bank has
su¢ ciently large amount of capital, K. On the other hand, if banks projects fail, the
bank has small amount of capital, K where K > K. The probability distribution of
banks capital is common knowledge: The bank can be low- or high capitalized with
a probability of, respectively,  and (1  ).
Table 4.1: Types of Assets
Then, knowing privately what its capitalization is, the bank chooses its investment,
allocates all deposits and capital in one of two assets: a prudent asset I whose return
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is , or a risky asset I whose return is  with probability  and zero otherwise. The
risky asset has higher expected return ( >  > 1), but the return on prudent asset
is guaranteed. Bank has an outside option which produces some payo¤s whose return
we normalize to one.
By the end of the period, projects returns are realized and bank reports its balance
sheet. Then regulator may audit banks book with probability p which costs c(p) with
c(0) = 0, c0 > 0, and c00 > 0. If the audit reveals that bank had been misreporting its
nancial statement, regulator may impose a penalty, P .
The regulator cares about nancial intermediation, the costs of audit and the costs
of bank failure. If regulator audits bank i which invests in asset j, regulators payo¤
SRi (j) is
SRi (j)  (Ki +D)Rij   (1  j)D   c(p): (4.1)
The rst term is the gross value of banks projects where Rij is the return on bank
is investment in project j.3 The second term is the costs of bank failure where j
equals  if the bank invests in risky assets, and equals one otherwise. The last term
is the audit costs.
The bank maximizes the expected value of its assets and deposit insurance. If
bank i invests in asset j, its payo¤ SBi (j) is
SBi (j)  (Ki +D)Rij + (1  j)D  D. (4.2)
The rst term is the gross value of banks projects. The second term is the deposit
insurance which the bank gets if its projects are failed. The last term is the amount
of deposit the bank has to pay back to depositors.4
3If the bank invests in risky assets R = +(1 )0 = , while if it invests in safe assets R = .
4If bank invests in risky assets, its payo¤s would be as follows:
SBRisky = (K +D) + (1  ) (0 +D) D = (K +D) + (1  )D  D.
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We will consider four separate cases. First, we look at the case of perfect informa-
tion as a benchmark: Regulator knows banks type and observes banks investment
choice. Then we examine both cases of one-dimensional asymmetric information, i.e.
pure adverse selection and pure moral hazard problems, each with and without au-
dit technology. Finally, we analyze how these results may change if there are both
adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
4.3.1 The Case of Symmetric Information
If information is symmetric, regulator observes banks capital and its investment













, i.e. choosing the type of assets (prudent assets I,
or risky assets I) for each type of banks (low-capitalized bankK, and high-capitalized
bank K) that maximizes the di¤erence between the value of banks projects should
they succeed and the costs of bank failure.
Proposition 1 If information is symmetric, and banks capital is such that K <
(1 )D
   D < K, regulator needs to require low-capitalized bank to invest in prudent
assets and high-capitalized bank in risky assets.
With probability  the projects return ; with probability (1   ) they return 0. The bank would
then get deposit insurance in the amount of D. In all cases the bank has to pay D back to depositors.
If the bank invests in safe assets, its payo¤s would be as follows:
SBSafe = (K +D) D
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Proof. We can show that K < (1 )D
    D is equivalent to (K +D) >
(K +D)    (1  )D: Regulators payo¤s are larger if low-capitalized bank in-
vests in prudent assets. Likewise, K > (1 )D







   (1  )D: Regulators payo¤s are larger if high-capitalized bank in-
vests in risky assets.
Intuitively, if banks capital is low, regulator wants the bank to avoid risky assets
and to invest in prudent assets like government bonds only. However, if banks capital
is su¢ ciently large to cushion possible loss, regulator wants the bank to extend risky
loans. In other words, regulator wants to prevent bank crisis, but it also cares about
banks role as nancial intermediary.
4.3.2 Pure Adverse Selection
Without Audit Technology
We now consider pure adverse selection problem. Let us suppose regulator does
not observe banks capital, but it knows banks investment decision.
Knowing banks investment decision only is not useful, however. Because (K +
D) + (1  )D   D > (K + D)   D for all K 2 K;K	, both types of bank
prefer to invest in risky assets. Both types of bank would invest in risky assets, but
regulator cannot tell whether the bank is adequately capitalized.
Proposition 2 Even though regulator observes banks investment decision, if it does
not know banks capital and it could not audit banks balance sheet, regulator cannot
enforce capital requirement.
Without auditing banks balance sheet, in the case of pure adverse selection prob-
lem, regulator cannot prevent low-capitalized bank from taking excessive risk.
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With Audit Technology
Suppose now regulator could audit banks balance sheet. Regulator then could
o¤er an incentive mechanism that includes a probability of audit p( eK) and a pun-
ishment P (K; eK) if audit reveals that banks reported capital eK di¤ers from its true
capital K.
Regulator wants to induce low-capitalized bank to invest in prudent assets and ad-
equately capitalized bank in risky assets. Regulator therefore needs to o¤er contracts
that satisfy the following incentive constraints:
(K +D) D > (K +D)  + (1  )D  D   pP (4.4) 
K +D

 + (1  )D  D >  K +D D   pP (4.5)
where p and p are the probability of auditing banks balance sheet if the bank invests
in prudent and risky assets respectively, while P = P (K;K) and P = P (K;K) are
the punishment regulator imposes on bank if the bank does not report its capital
truthfully.
We assume that regulator may seize owners assets if regulator nds out that
the bank does not report truthfully. The punishments cannot be greater than some
exogenous threshold W , so that
P 6 W (4.6)
P 6 W . (4.7)
Bank will participate if its owners get higher payo¤s from operating the bank than
those from investing in outside options. The ex-ante participation constraint is
 [(K +D) D] + (1  )  K +D  + (1  )D  D > 0 (4.8)
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which is always satised by construction.
The regulators problem is then
max
f(I;p;P ); (I;p;P )g


(K +D)  c(p)+(1 )  K +D    (1  )D   c(p) (4.9)
subject to (4.4), (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7) where I and I are prudent- and risky assets
respectively.
Proposition 3 Regulator o¤ers the following contract:

(I; 0; 0); (I; p;W )
	
. If reg-
ulator does not observe banks capital but it could audit banks book, regulator could
enforce capital requirement by auditing bank that invests in risky assets only with
probability p = [(K +D) (   ) + (1  )D] =W .
Proof. Adequately capitalized banks incentive constraint (4.5) is always satised,
and therefore is irrelevant. Because auditing is costly, regulator does not need to
audit bank that invests in prudent assets hence, p = 0 at the optimum. Moreover,
because (4.5) holds strictly, the punishment inequality (4.7) becomes irrelevant too.
Furthermore, regulator could relax the low-capitalized banks incentive constraint
(4.4) by raising the punishment as much as possible, i.e. by setting constraint (4.6)
as equality P = W .
Therefore, only constraints (4.4) and (4.6) are relevant. Substituting P = W into
inequality (4.4), we get p > [(K +D) (   ) + (1  )D] =W . Because regulators
objective function is decreasing in p, at the optimum regulator audits bank that
invests in risky asset only with a probability p = [(K +D) (   ) + (1  )D] =W .
The probability of auditing bank that invests in risky assets p is increasing in 
and  and decreasing in  and W . The higher the return on risky assets and its
probability of success, the more frequently regulator should audit bank that invests
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in risky assets. On the other hand, the higher the return on prudent assets and the
larger the amount of assets that regulator could conscate from owners in the event
of misreporting, the less frequently regulator could audit banks balance sheet.
4.3.3 Pure Moral Hazard
Without Audit Technology
Suppose now regulator observes banks capital, but it cannot tell what banks
investment decision is. Like in the case of pure adverse selection without audit,
knowing one piece information only does not help. Both types of bank prefer to
invest in risky assets, and would do so if the bank has its way.
Regulator may know that the bank is low capitalized. However, regulator cannot
tell whether the bank complies with the capital requirement by investing in prudent
assets.
Proposition 4 Even though regulator observes banks capital, if it does not know
banks investment decision and it could not audit banks balance sheet, regulator cannot
enforce capital requirement.
Like the case of pure adverse selection problem without audit, in the case of pure
moral hazard problem without audit regulator cannot prevent low-capitalized banks
from taking too much risk.
With Audit Technology
If regulator could audit banks balance sheet, regulator could o¤er an incentive
mechanism that includes a probability of audit p(eI) and a punishment P (I; eI) if audit
reveals that low-capitalized bank invests in risky assets and vice versa.
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The incentive-, punishment-, and ex-ante participation constraints for the case of
pure moral hazard with audit are similar to those in the case of pure adverse selection
with audit.5 The only di¤erence is that now we dene p and p as the probability of
auditing banks balance sheet if the bank is low- and adequately capitalized respec-
tively, while P = P (I; I) and P = P (I; I) are the punishment regulator imposes on
bank if the bank does not report its type of investment truthfully.
Regulators problem is therefore maximizing (4.9) subject to (4.4), (4.5), (4.6) and
(4.7). Using the same analysis, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Regulator o¤ers the following contract:

(K; 0; 0); (K; p;W )
	
. If
regulator does not observe banks investment decision but it could audit banks book,
regulator could enforce capital requirement by auditing low-capitalized bank only with
probability p = [(K +D) (   ) + (1  )D] =W .
This result is quite similar to that of Proposition (3): In the case of pure adverse
selection with audit, regulator audits bank that invests in risky assets only; in the
case of pure moral hazard with audit, regulator audits low-capitalized bank only.
4.3.4 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Without Audit Technology
If we have both adverse selection and moral hazard problems and regulator could
not audit banks book, regulator has no instrument at all to enforce capital require-
ment. Therefore, proposition similar to Propositions (2) and (4) applies here as well.
5In this pure moral hazard setting, we could assume ex-post contracting instead. In the case





 + (1  )D   D > 0. The same results would apply, however, because these two
constraints are irrelevant.
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Proposition 6 If regulator does not observe banks capital and investment decision,
and it cannot audit banks balance sheet, regulator cannot enforce capital requirement.
With Audit Technology
Like the cases of pure moral hazard- and pure adverse selection with audit, if reg-
ulator could audit banks balance sheet, regulator could o¤er an incentive mechanism
that includes a probability of audit p and a punishment P .
Because the structure of our model is quite simple, it turns out that the punishment-
and ex-ante participation constraints in this case are similar to those of pure adverse
selection with audit or pure moral hazard with audit. Constraints that di¤er are
incentive constraints only. Now regulator cannot tell which bank invests in prudent
assets or which bank is adequately capitalized. Regulator would therefore have to
introduce the same probability of audit p into both incentive constraints as follows:
(K +D) D > (K +D)  + (1  )D  D   pP (4.10) 
K +D

 + (1  )D  D >  K + 1 D   pP (4.11)
where P and P are the punishment regulator imposes on low-capitalized and ad-
equately capitalized bank, respectively if the bank does not report its capital or
investment decision truthfully.
Regulators problem is again maximizing (4.9) subject to (4.10), (4.11), (4.6) and
(4.7). Like previous analyses, only constraints (4.10) and (4.6) are binding, and
similar result would therefore apply.
Proposition 7 Regulator o¤ers the following contract: f(K; I; p;W )g. If regulator
does not observe both banks capital and its type of investment but regulator could
audit banks book, regulator could enforce capital requirement by auditing all types of
bank with probability p = [(K +D) (   ) + (1  )D] =W .
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4.4 Discussion
These results show that without auditing banks balance sheet, regulator cannot
enforce capital requirement: Regulator cannot induce low-capitalized bank to invest
in prudent assets. Regulator simply has its hands tied and, if bank has its way,
low-capitalized bank would simply invest in risky assets.
If regulator could audit banks balance sheet, then regulator could relax banks
incentive constraints. In the case of pure adverse selection, i.e. if regulator observes
banks investment decision but not its capital, regulator needs to audit bank that
invests in risky assets only with a strictly positive probability. Likewise, in the case
of pure moral hazard problem, i.e. if regulator observes banks capital but not its
investment decision, regulator needs to audit low-capitalized bank only. However, if
regulator does not observe both banks capital and investment decision, regulator has
to audit all types of bank with a strictly positive probability.
These results may seem too obvious. However, they show that in developing
countries where moral hazard and adverse selection problems may be di¢ cult to be
alleviated, auditing banksbalance sheet is necessary to enforce capital requirement.
Of course, regulator could lower the probability of audit, or even in some cases
could stop auditing, if it has access to ex-post veriable information regarding banks
capital and investment decision. That may be possible if there are reliable public
auditors or market for bankssubordinated debt. Unless these types of ex-post veri-
able information are available, however, regulator may have to audit banksbalance




We have shown that, if there is moral hazard problem or adverse selection problem,
regulator has to audit banksbalance sheet with positive probability to enforce capital
requirement.
If regulator observes banks investment decision but not its capital, regulator needs
to audit bank that invests in risky assets only with a strictly positive probability. If
regulator observes banks capital but not its investment decision, regulator needs to
audit low-capitalized bank only. However, if regulator does not observe banks capital
and its investment decision, regulator has to audit all types of bank with a strictly
positive probability.
These results are relevant for developing countries where asymmetric information
problems are more di¢ cult to be alleviated. In particular, audit is necessary if regu-
lator does not have access to ex-post veriable information regarding bankscapital
and their investment decisions.
We could extend this essay in several ways. First, our analyses turn out to be
simple is partly because the participation constraints are always satised. We could
further introduce other instruments and regulations such as taxes, risk-based deposit
insurance premium, or reserve requirement to make our model more realistic, the
participation constraints less trivial, and the interaction among the constraints more
complicated. We conjecture, however, that regulator would still need to use audit
policy to enforce capital requirement.
Second, it would be also interesting to see how our results stand if regulator has
access to ex-post veriable information. Regulator may then be able to o¤er contract
which includes probability of audit and this ex-post information.
Another possible extension is dynamic interaction between regulator and bank. If
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regulator and representative bank play dynamic game, there may be cases in which
regulator nds it di¢ cult to enforce capital requirement, for example if the contract
is not renegotiation proof.6
6As for the simple one-stage game analyzed in this essay, we can explore the possibility of rene-
gotiation as follows: Suppose, in the case of both adverse selection and moral hazard problems, the
representative bank nds out that it is low capitalized. Then it may renegotiate the contract so that
regulator does not audit its book and it could invest in risky assets. In return, the bank o¤ers some
money guarantee to the regulator.
If the bank invests in safe assets, the banks payo¤s are (K + D)   D while the regulators
payo¤s are (K + D)   c(p). However, if the renegotiation follows through, and the bank invests
in risky assets, then it will get (K + D) + (1   )D   D. The bank may gain as much as
(K+D) (   )+ (1  )D. Excluding any possible transfer, the regulator would get (K+D) 
(1  )D with a potential gain in the amount of (K +D)   (1  )D  [(K +D)  c(p)] which
equals (K +D) (   )  (1  )D + c(p).
The rst two terms, (K +D) (   )   (1  )D, is less than zero. Therefore, if the cost of
audit, c(p), is su¢ ciently small, renegotiation is not possible. However, if audit is very costly so that
regulator gains a lot from not auditing banks book, renegotiation may follow through.
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Chapter 5
BanksE¢ ciency and Types of Ownership
5.1 Introduction
Taking Indonesian banking industry as a case study, this essay examines the re-
lationship between bankstypes of ownership and bankse¢ ciency.
The central question is whether bankse¢ ciency correlates with types of owner-
ship. Do state-owned banks tend to be the least e¢ cient? Do privately owned banks
and foreign-owned banks perform better than state banks?
To analyze the relationship between types of ownership and e¢ ciency, we estimate
stochastic frontier models in which we introduce type of ownership dummies in the
ine¢ ciency terms. To control banksheterogeneity more properly into account, we
use Greenes "true" panel stochastic frontier models.
We nd that state-owned banks in Indonesia to be the least e¢ cient and joint-
venture banks to be the most e¢ cient banks. Foreign-owned banks, however, are not
more e¢ cient than private national banks, though they are still more e¢ cient than
state-owned banks.
This essay di¤ers from the literature on bankse¢ ciency and types of ownership
in that, by using "true" panel stochastic frontier model, we take unobserved hetero-
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geneity more properly into account. Second, by examining Indonesian banks, we o¤er
an insight into the relationship between bankse¢ ciency and types of ownership in a
developing country that experienced an arguably hasty liberalization, hit by several
banking crises, and currently supervised by stronger central bank.
This essay is organized as follows: In Section 5.2 we review related literature and
in Section 5.3 we briey describe bank ownership in Indonesia. Section 5.4 presents
our methodology. Section 5.5 describes the data and Section 5.6 discusses empirical
results. In Section 5.7 we do some robustness checks. Section 5.8 concludes.
5.2 Related Literature
This essays contribution is, in examining the relationship between bankstypes of
ownership and bankse¢ ciency, we control unobserved heterogeneity more properly
into account using Greenes "true" panel data stochastic frontier models.
We discuss in Chapter 3 how state-owned banks may perform poorly. Like non-
nancial public enterprises, state-owned banks may be prone to political intervention
and weak corporate governance. They also often su¤er from lack of competitors.
We also survey the literature on how foreign owners may improve bankse¢ ciency.
Foreign owners may bring modern banking practices and technology from their parent
banks. Second, foreign owners are usually strategic investors: They could take control
of the banks, and hence are better able to monitor banksmanagers. Third, unlike
state-owned banks, private- and foreign-owned banks do not su¤er from the usual
problems of public enterprises.1
Some researchers have empirically shown that state-owned banks are typically less
1For a literature review on the relationship between bankstypes of ownership and performance,
see the literature we discuss in Chapter 3.
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Ownership Number of banks
State owned 5
Large private national 35





Table 5.1: Ownership of Banks, 2001
e¢ cient than private banks; and foreign-owned banks are among the most e¢ cient.
Fries and Taci (2005), for example, nd that private banks in fteen post-communist
countries are more e¢ cient than state-owned banks. Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel
(2005a), on the other hand, show that privately owned banks do not perform better
than state-owned ones. Clarke, Cull, and Shirley (2005) survey the literature on bank
privatization in developing countries, and they nd that, according to the most recent
research, banksperformance improves after privatization.
5.3 Bank Ownership in Indonesia
Indonesia has ve types of bank ownership. For the year 2001, for example,
there are 5 state-owned banks, 35 "large private-national" banks, 37 "small private-
national" banks, 26 "regional-development" banks, 18 "joint-venture " banks, and 11
foreign-owned banks.
State banks are among the largest, followed by "large private-national" banks
and "small private-national" banks. The largest eight banks have eighty percent of
Indonesian banking assets. Except state banks and a few "large-private national"
banks, most other banks are quite small.
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All types of banks in general could o¤er all types of banking activities. How-
ever, among domestically owned banks, only state-owned banks and "large private-
national" banks may trade foreign currencies.
Regional-development banks are owned by provincial governments, and therefore
are like state banks though they are typically small. "Joint venture" banks are joint
ventures between domestic- and foreign owners. Foreign-owned banks are exclusively
owned by foreign investors.
5.4 The Methodology
We estimate bankscost e¢ ciency using stochastic frontier models. These models
provide an estimate of the cost frontier, the predicted minimum costs given banks
technology, mix of outputs, input prices, and characteristics. The frontier incorpo-
rates two elements: the deterministic cost function, and the bank- and time specic
idiosyncratic terms which locate the banks own stochastic frontier around the deter-
ministic component. We then dene that any departure of observed bankscost from
its own frontier is due to banksine¢ ciency.2
5.4.1 Panel Stochastic Frontier Models
We use panel stochastic frontier models developed by Greene (2002, 2005), the
"true" xed-e¤ect and "true" random-e¤ect models. The "true" xed-e¤ect model is




cit = i + xit+it + uit (5.1)
vit  N(0; 2v) (5.2)
uit  N+(it; 2u) (5.3)
where cit is the logarithm of costs of bank i at time t, i is bank-xed e¤ects rep-
resenting bank-specic heterogeneity, and xit is the deterministic core of the cost
function of bank i at time t (xit is the argument of the cost function, a vector of
outputs and input prices; and  is a vector of parameters to be estimated). The two
remaining terms are it, the error term, and uit, the cost ine¢ ciency component. We
assume the error terms it to be white noise while the ine¢ ciency term uit is distrib-
uted half-normal or truncated-normal. They are independently distributed from each
other.
Because we assume the error- and ine¢ ciency terms follow some distributions,
the "true" xed-e¤ect stochastic frontier model therefore is not xed e¤ect estimator.
Instead, Greene estimates this model using maximum likelihood.3
We could dene the measure cost e¢ ciency, CEit, as the ratio of minimum cost
to actual cost, i.e.
CEit =
exp (i + xit+it)
exp (i + xit+it + uit)
= exp ( uit) (5.4)
Because uit is non-negative, the value of cost e¢ ciency lies between zero and one,
with the value of one representing the most cost e¢ cient bank. We could also dene
a measure of cost ine¢ ciency as (1  exp( uit)).
We could estimate the ine¢ ciency terms using the conditional estimator of uit as
proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982). The estimate buit then equals E (uitj"it) where
3See Greene (2002) for the details of likelihood function derivation.
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"it = uit + it.4
Alternatively, if we assume that bank-xed e¤ects i is uncorrelated with other
terms in the regression, we could estimate cost frontier using "true" random-e¤ect
stochastic frontier model as follows:
cit = 0 + i + xit+it + uit. (5.5)
Except for the assumption regarding i, this model is exactly the same as the "true"
xed e¤ect model above. To estimate the model, Greene rewrites it as a random
parameter model as follows:
cit = (0 + i) + xit+it + uit (5.6)
which then he estimates using simulated maximum likelihood.5
5.4.2 How They Di¤er from Standard Models
These two models di¤er from the standard panel stochastic frontier models in
one respect: They take unobserved heterogeneity more properly into account.
For the standard xed-e¤ect stochastic frontier model, Schmidt and Sickles (1984),
for example, propose the following stochastic frontier model:
cit = + xit+it + ui (5.7)
4Within the framework of the normal and half-normal stochastic frontier models, the estimator
of uit is as follows:












,  = u=v, (:) is the standard normal density function, and (:) is the
standard normal cumulative distribution function.
5See Greene (2002) for the details of likelihood function derivation, and a discussion on simulated
maximum likelihood.
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which they rewrite as
cit = i + xit+it (5.8)
where i = + ui. They dene the estimate of ine¢ ciency as bui = bi  min
i
(bi).
The problem of this model, however, is that the individual xed e¤ects of the
xed-e¤ect estimators, i, absorbs time-invariant heterogeneity and the ine¢ ciency
term bui. We therefore cannot distinguish ine¢ ciency from unobserved heterogeneity
using this standard xed-e¤ect stochastic frontier model.
The same criticism applies to the standard random-e¤ect stochastic frontier model.
Schmidt and Sickles (1984), for example, propose the following random-e¤ect model:
cit = + xit+it + ui (5.9)
= (+ ) + xit+it + u

i (5.10)
where  = E(ui) and ui = ui    which has a zero mean by denition. They rewrite
the model as follows:
cit = i + xit+it (5.11)
where i = +ui and bui = bi min
i
(bi). They estimate this model using GLS panel
data method. Again, like in the case of standard xed-e¤ect stochastic frontier mod-
els, in this model we cannot distinguish ine¢ ciency from unobserved heterogeneity.
5.4.3 Introducing BanksTypes of Ownership
Our focus, however, is not the magnitude of the ine¢ ciency terms, but rather
how the ine¢ ciency terms correlate with some environment variables, i.e. banks
types of ownership.
To examine how bankse¢ ciency varies among di¤erent types of ownership, we
follow Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995) by modeling the mean of ine¢ ciency term
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uit as a function of bankstype of ownership dummies. Specically, we write it in
Equation (5.3) as follows:
it = zi+wit (5.12)
where zi is a vector of type of ownership dummies, wit is a random variable which
follows truncated-distribution with zero mean and variance 2u. Because it > 0, the
point of truncation is  zi. The ine¢ ciency term therefore has a truncated-normal
distribution, and its point of truncation depends on type of ownership dummies.
This single-step estimation of bankscorrelates is more appropriate than the two-
step estimation often used in the literature. As Wang and Schmidt (2002) argue, the
two-step procedures produce biased estimates. Besides, these two-step procedures do
not consistently obey their econometrics assumptions.6
5.5 Data
Like two previous empirical essays, we use the quarterly nancial statement of
Indonesian banking industry provided by Bank Indonesias Department of Banking
Statistics. The dataset consists of quarterly nancial reports of about 130 banks over
more than four-year period since the fourth quarter of 2000 to the second quarter
of 2005. It covers all commercial banks in Indonesia, and, because Indonesias cap-
ital markets are still quite small, this data represents a large portion of Indonesias
nancial industry.7
6In the rst stage, the ine¢ ciency term uit is assumed to be independently and identically dis-
tributed. In the second stage, however, the ine¢ ciency is specied as a function of types ownership
dummies zit. Second, if uit is indeed a function of zit, the estimates of coe¢ cients of zit would be
biased too.
7We describe this dataset further in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The summary statistics of key
variables are available in Tables A.3-A.7 in the Appendix.
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5.5.1 Arguments of the Cost Function
Following Kaparakis, Miller and Noulas (1994), we model banks as nancial rms
which transform various nancial and physical resources into loans and investments.
We introduce four outputs and three input prices. The output variables are banks
loan (Y1), government bonds holding (Y2), securities holding (Y3), and other assets
that cannot be included in the previous categories (Y4).
The input variables are labor, capital, as well as interest-bearing-deposits and
other liabilities. The price of labor (W1) is the average wage per employee. However,
because we do not have the data for the number of banksemployees for the entire
period, we approximate it using the personnel expenses divided by the amount of
banksassets. Similarly, we use interest expenses divided by the amount of interest-
bearing liabilities as the proxy for the price of deposits and purchased funds (W2).
We approximate the price of capital using the sum of other operating expenses and
non-operating expenses divided by the amount of banksxed-assets (W3).
5.5.2 The Cost Function
We t a Cobb-Douglass cost function for its simplicity. We impose linear homo-
geneity in prices by dividing bankstotal costs (Cost), the price of labor as well as
the price of deposits and purchased funds by the price of capital (W3). The set of
variables we use are therefore as follows:
cit = ln(Costit=W3it) (5.13)
wjit = ln(Wjit=W3it), j = 1; 2 (5.14)
ykit = ln(Ykit), k = 1; 2; 3; 4: (5.15)
Using this Cobb-Douglass cost function, we can write, for example, the "true"
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xed-e¤ect model of Equation (5.1) as follows:






kykit+it + uit (5.16)
5.5.3 Type of Ownership Dummies
We dene six ownership dummies. They are TState (for state-owned banks),
TPrivate1 (for large private-national banks), TPrivate2 (for small private-national
banks), TDevelopment (for regional-development banks), TJoint (for joint-venture
banks), and TForeign (for foreign-owned banks).
5.6 Results
5.6.1 Basic Results
Despite being more attractive econometrically, estimation of the normal-truncated
normal stochastic frontier in one step like the one we do here proves to be di¢ cult.
As Limdep (2002) points out, identication may be unstable, and the model often
fails to converge. The problem is even more severe for the xed e¤ect models. Devel-
opers of Limdep themselves have "extremely limited success" with normal-truncated
normal xed e¤ect model and they suggest that estimation of this model is "likely to
be extremely problematic in all but the most favorable of cases".
We present all available results in Table 5.2. The upper panel provides the es-
timates of the type of ownership dummies introduced into the mean of ine¢ ciency
term uit while the lower panel shows the estimates of the cost function.
We fail to get the estimate for the Greenes "true" xed e¤ect stochastic frontier






Large private national 12.00 -1.86
(5.23) (0.32)
Small private national 12.97 -3.23
(5.54) (0.38)
Regional development 32.85 -2.68
(14.23) (0.42)
Joint venture 23.68 -3.63
(9.03) (0.43)







Gov't bond 0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.00)







Note: "Random effect" is Greene's "true" random effect stochastic frontier
model. Standard errors are in parentheses
Table 5.2: Basic Results
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we present the results in Column (1) for the sake of completeness.
Column (2) shows the results for the Greenes "true" random e¤ect model. We
nd that private national, regional-development, joint-venture , and foreign-owned
banks are more e¢ cient than state-owned banks. Joint-venture banks appear to be
the most e¢ cient. Small private national banks and regional-development banks come
in second and third places respectively.
Surprisingly, our results show that foreign-owned banks perform less impressive
than we expect them to be. They are more e¢ cient than state-owned banks, but are
less e¢ cient than joint-venture banks. The coe¢ cient of foreign-owned bank dummy
is less than those of small private national- and regional-development banks. However,
considering their large standard errors, they are not that di¤erent from each other
statistically.
It would be interesting to explore why foreign-owned banks are not more e¢ cient
than private-national banks. Perhaps, this is because regulator allows foreign banks
to establish branches in large cities only. This restriction then may prevent foreign-
owned banks from taking advantage of economic of scale or that of scope.
5.6.2 Properties of the Cost Function
Our estimated cost functions, both pooled- and "true" random e¤ect stochastic
frontier models, satisfy basic properties of a cost function.8
Because the coe¢ cients of input prices shown in the lower panel of Table 5.2 are
positive, the estimated cost function is nondecreasing in prices. The coe¢ cients of
outputs are also positive, hence the function is also nondecreasing in output. We
8See, for example, Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green (1995) for a discussion on the properties of
cost function.
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can see that the Hessian of the estimated cost function is negative semidenite, and
therefore the function is concave in input prices. The cost function is homogeneous
of degree one in input prices because we impose this restriction when we construct
our data.9
5.7 Robustness
5.7.1 Heterogeneity in Cost Function
Previously we introduce the environmental variables by modeling the mean of
ine¢ ciency term uit as a function of bankstype of ownership dummies. Now, instead,
we assume that bankstype of ownership directly a¤ects the cost function. Hence, we
include the type of ownership dummies along with the arguments of the cost function
in the stochastic frontier which we write as follows:
cit = i + xit+zi+it + uit (5.17)
where zi is the type of ownership dummies of bank i. In e¤ect, this specication
would allow di¤erent types of banks to have di¤erent cost frontier, and the coe¢ cient
of zi would tell us how much larger the costs of one type of banks compared to others.
Table 5.3 presents the results for the pooled- and "true" random e¤ect stochastic
frontier. Column (1) for the pooled stochastic frontier model shows that only joint-
venture and foreign-owned banks that seems to have lower costs than state-owned
banks. Joint-venture banks have about 15 percent lower costs, while foreign-owned
banks have six percent lower costs. The estimate of the coe¢ cient of foreign-owned
dummy is not statistically signicant, however.
9The estimates we present in the following section also satisfy basic properties of a cost function.
Because it is obvious from the coe¢ cients of input prices and those of outputs of the Cobb-Douglass
cost function, we will not discuss them in detail.
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Column (2) shows the results for the "true" random e¤ect model. Taking hetero-
geneity explicitly into account, all types of banks except regional-development and
foreign-owned banks appear to have lower costs than state banks. Among these esti-
mates, however, only the coe¢ cient of joint-venture dummy is statistically signicant.
Foreign-owned banks seem to have higher costs, though its estimate is not statistically
signicant.
These results are quite consistent with our basic results: There is some evidence
that state-owned banks are the least e¢ cient, and joint-venture banks are the most
e¢ cient.
5.7.2 Averages of Ine¢ ciency Terms
We could also get another picture of the relationship between ine¢ ciency terms
and bankstype of ownership by looking at the averages of ine¢ ciency terms. First, we
estimate stochastic frontier models without introducing types of ownership dummies,
either in the ine¢ ciency term or directly in the cost function. Then, we calculate the
averages of e¢ ciency terms of each type of ownerships and their standard deviation.
Table 5.4 presents the averages of ine¢ ciency term. The results for the pooled
model in Row (1) show that the averages are quite similar which indicates that no
type of banks appears signicantly more e¢ cient than the others. The results for the
"true" random e¤ect in Row (2) are similar to those of basic results: State-owned
banks seem to be the most ine¢ cient, while joint-venture banks are the most e¢ cient.







Large private national 0.11 -0.36
(0.03) (0.19)
Small private national 0.20 -0.34
(0.04) (0.20)
Regional development 0.12 0.07
(0.04) (0.21)
Joint venture -0.15 -0.88
(0.03) (0.19)







Gov't bond 0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.00)







Note: "Random effect" is Greene's "true" random effect stochastic frontier
model. Standard errors are in parentheses












Pooled (1) 0.33 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.46
(0.25) (0.18) (0.18) (0.10) (0.27) (0.88)
Random effect (2) 2.51 1.58 1.01 1.22 0.94 1.34
(0.89) (0.57) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25) (0.31)
Note: "Random effect" is Greene's "true" random effect stochastic frontier model. "Regional" stands for regional-development
bank. Standard errors are in parentheses
Table 5.4: The Averages of Ine¢ ciency Terms
5.8 Concluding Remarks
We have examined the relationship between bankstype of ownership and banks
e¢ ciency using Greenes "true" panel data stochastic frontier model.
We nd that, even after taking unobserved heterogeneity more properly into ac-
count, state-owned banks in Indonesia seem to be the least e¢ cient banks and joint-




In the rst essay, we examine the impact of capital requirement on banksrisk
taking. We nd some evidence that banks that are under regulatory pressure increase
their capital or reduce risk to comply with the capital requirement. Because most
of the statistical signicance of our results is low, our results are too weak to be
general. Moreover, though banks that are under regulatory pressure tend to increase
capital or reduce risk, di¤erent types of banks respond to the capital requirement
di¤erently. Among undercapitalized banks, only large private-national banks that are
under regulatory pressure that increase capital or reduce risk more than adequately
capitalized banks.
The second essay examines the impact of selling developing countriesbailed-out
banks to strategic foreign investors on banks performance. We show that, after
overcoming problems in treatment evaluation, we nd that strategic sale of banks in
developing country like Indonesia does lead to cost reduction. On average, depending
on the specication, strategic sale is associated with 10-20 percent lower costs.
In the third essay we model how e¤ective capital regulation and audit policy are
if regulator does not observe bankscapital and investment decision. We show that,
if there is moral hazard problem or adverse selection problem, regulator have to audit
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banksbalance sheet to enforce capital requirement.
In the last essay, we examine the relationship between bankstype of ownership
and bankse¢ ciency. Even after taking unobserved heterogeneity more properly into
account, we nd that state-owned banks in Indonesia to be the least e¢ cient and
joint-venture banks to be the most e¢ cient banks.
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Unit Observations Mean StandardDeviation
Capital Rp billion 2,468 0.73 2.37
Risk Weighted Assets Rp billion 2,468 3.36 9.86
CAR 2,469 23.40 16.79
RegPCA 2,458 0.02 0.13
RegProb 2,458 0.18 0.38
Size Rp billion 2,509 8.07 26.77
Income Rp billion 2,340 21.44 77.36
Table A.1: Key Variables Used in Chapter 2
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Observations Mean StandardDeviation
ln(Cost) 2,408 11.21 1.78
S 2,618 0.02 0.14
ln(Loan) 2,501 13.28 1.88
ln(Asset) 2,509 14.11 1.78
ln(Deposit) 2,488 13.76 1.86
ln(Price) 2,408 -3.96 0.78
Table A.2: Key Variables Used in Chapter 3
Observations Mean StandardDeviation
All banks
ln(Cost/W3) 2,393 12.10 1.67
ln(Y1) 2,393 13.26 1.94
ln(Y2) 2,393 4.46 6.27
ln(Y3) 2,393 7.38 5.49
ln(Y4) 2,393 13.07 1.70
ln(W1/W3) 2,393 -3.88 1.16
ln(W2/W3) 2,393 -2.40 1.09




ln(Cost/W3) 90 15.41 2.55
ln(Y1) 90 16.86 1.09
ln(Y2) 90 11.40 5.95
ln(Y3) 90 15.16 5.28
ln(Y4) 90 16.16 1.22
ln(W1/W3) 90 -4.66 1.81
ln(W2/W3) 90 -2.48 1.23
Regional development
ln(Cost/W3) 449 12.04 1.10
ln(Y1) 449 13.17 1.11
ln(Y2) 449 5.29 5.30
ln(Y3) 449 4.13 5.24
ln(Y4) 449 13.40 1.07
ln(W1/W3) 449 -3.58 0.65
ln(W2/W3) 449 -2.68 0.65




ln(Cost/W3) 647 13.15 1.61
ln(Y1) 647 14.04 1.58
ln(Y2) 647 9.47 4.85
ln(Y3) 647 6.68 7.12
ln(Y4) 647 13.77 1.44
ln(W1/W3) 647 -3.86 0.89
ln(W2/W3) 647 -2.05 0.76
Small private
ln(Cost/W3) 698 11.22 0.99
ln(Y1) 698 11.78 1.41
ln(Y2) 698 4.67 5.12
ln(Y3) 698 2.22 4.33
ln(Y4) 698 11.34 0.96
ln(W1/W3) 698 -3.16 1.07
ln(W2/W3) 698 -1.62 0.80




ln(Cost/W3) 331 11.09 1.02
ln(Y1) 331 13.64 1.30
ln(Y2) 331 8.97 4.05
ln(Y3) 331 1.81 4.18
ln(Y4) 331 13.26 0.95
ln(W1/W3) 331 -5.02 0.82
ln(W2/W3) 331 -3.50 0.76
Foreign
ln(Cost/W3) 178 12.01 1.24
ln(Y1) 178 13.93 2.99
ln(Y2) 178 10.73 4.35
ln(Y3) 178 5.55 6.73
ln(Y4) 178 14.60 1.14
ln(W1/W3) 178 -5.03 0.81
ln(W2/W3) 178 -3.94 0.88
Table A.6: Key Variables Used in Chapter 5: Joint Venture and Foreign Banks
Observations Mean StandardDeviation
Bank types
State 2,618 0.04 0.19
Large private national 2,618 0.27 0.44
Small private national 2,618 0.29 0.45
Regional development 2,618 0.19 0.39
Joint venture 2,618 0.14 0.35
Foreign 2,618 0.08 0.27
Public 2,618 0.14 0.35
Financial ratios
ROA 2,398 2.36 3.50
NPL 2,405 9.23 14.84
NIM 2,464 5.79 3.98
Table A.7: Summary Statistics of Other Variables
